Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified
  Models by Esponda, Ignacio & Pouzo, Demian
Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling
Agents with Misspecified Models∗
Ignacio Esponda Demian Pouzo
(WUSTL) (UC Berkeley)
May 10, 2016
Abstract
We develop an equilibrium framework that relaxes the standard assumption
that people have a correctly-specified view of their environment. Each player
is characterized by a (possibly misspecified) subjective model, which describes
the set of feasible beliefs over payoff-relevant consequences as a function of ac-
tions. We introduce the notion of a Berk-Nash equilibrium: Each player follows
a strategy that is optimal given her belief, and her belief is restricted to be the
best fit among the set of beliefs she considers possible. The notion of best fit
is formalized in terms of minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence, which is
endogenous and depends on the equilibrium strategy profile. Standard solution
concepts such as Nash equilibrium and self-confirming equilibrium constitute
special cases where players have correctly-specified models. We provide a learn-
ing foundation for Berk-Nash equilibrium by extending and combining results
from the statistics literature on misspecified learning and the economics litera-
ture on learning in games.
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1 Introduction
Most economists recognize that the simplifying assumptions underlying their models
are often wrong. But, despite recognizing that models are likely to be misspecified,
the standard approach (with exceptions noted below) assumes that economic agents
have a correctly specified view of their environment. We present an equilibrium frame-
work that relaxes this standard assumption and allows the modeler to postulate that
economic agents have a subjective and possibly incorrect view of their world.
An objective game represents the true environment faced by the agent (or players,
in the case of several interacting agents). Payoff relevant states and privately observed
signals are drawn from an objective probability distribution. Each player observes her
own private signal and then players simultaneously choose actions. The action profile
and the realized state determine consequences, and consequences determine payoffs.
In addition, each player has a subjective model representing her own view of the
environment. Formally, a subjective model is a set of probability distributions over
own consequences as a function of a player’s own action and information. Crucially, we
allow the subjective model of one or more players to be misspecified, which roughly
means that the set of subjective distributions does not include the true, objective
distribution. For example, a consumer might perceive a nonlinear price schedule to
be linear and, therefore, respond to average, not marginal, prices. Or traders might
not realize that the value of trade is partly determined by the terms of trade.
A Berk-Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that, for each player, there
exists a belief with support in her subjective model satisfying two conditions. First,
the strategy is optimal given the belief. Second, the belief puts probability one on
the set of subjective distributions over consequences that are “closest” to the true
distribution, where the true distribution is determined by the objective game and the
actual strategy profile. The notion of “closest” is given by a weighted version of the
Kullback-Leibler divergence, also known as relative entropy.
Berk-Nash equilibrium includes standard and boundedly rational solution con-
cepts in a common framework, such as Nash, self-confirming (e.g., Battigalli (1987),
Fudenberg and Levine (1993a), Dekel et al. (2004)), fully cursed (Eyster and Rabin,
2005), and analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005), Jehiel and Koessler
(2008)). For example, suppose that the game is correctly specified (i.e., the support of
each player’s prior contains the true distribution) and that the game is strongly iden-
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tified (i.e., there is a unique distribution—whether or not correct—that matches the
observed data). Then Berk-Nash equilibrium is equivalent to Nash equilibrium. If the
strong identification assumption is dropped, then Berk-Nash is a self-confirming equi-
librium. In addition to unifying previous work, our framework provides a systematic
approach for extending previous cases and exploring new types of misspecifications.
We provide a foundation for Berk-Nash equilibrium (and the use of Kullback-
Leibler divergence as a measure of “distance”) by studying a dynamic setup with a
fixed number of players playing the objective game repeatedly. Each player believes
that the environment is stationary and starts with a prior over her subjective model.
In each period, players use the observed consequences to update their beliefs according
to Bayes’ rule. The main objective is to characterize limiting behavior when players
behave optimally but learn with a possibly misspecified subjective model.1
The main result is that, if players’ behavior converges, then it converges to a Berk-
Nash equilibrium. A converse result, showing that we can converge to any Berk-Nash
equilibrium of the game for some initial (non-doctrinaire) prior, does not hold. But we
obtain a positive convergence result by relaxing the assumption that players exactly
optimize. For any given Berk-Nash equilibrium, we show that convergence to that
equilibrium occurs if agents are myopic and make asymptotically optimal choices (i.e.,
optimization mistakes vanish with time).
There is a longstanding interest in studying the behavior of agents who hold mis-
specified views of the world. Examples come from diverse fields including industrial
organization, mechanism design, information economics, macroeconomics, and psy-
chology and economics (e.g., Arrow and Green (1973), Kirman (1975), Sobel (1984),
Kagel and Levin (1986), Nyarko (1991), Sargent (1999), Rabin (2002)), although
there is often no explicit reference to misspecified learning. Most of the literature,
however, focuses on particular settings, and there has been little progress in devel-
oping a unified framework. Our treatment unifies both “rational” and “boundedly
rational” approaches, thus emphasizing that modeling the behavior of misspecified
players does not constitute a large departure from the standard framework.
Arrow and Green (1973) provide a general treatment and make a distinction be-
tween objective and subjective games. Their framework, though, is more restrictive
than ours in terms of the types of misspecifications that players are allowed to have.
1In the case of multiple agents, the environment need not be stationary, and so we are ignoring
repeated game considerations where players take into account how their actions affect others’ future
play. We discuss the extension to a population model with a continuum of agents in Section 5.
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Moreover, they do not establish existence or provide a learning foundation for equilib-
rium. Recently, Spiegler (2014) introduced a framework that uses Bayesian networks
to analyze decision making under imperfect understanding of correlation structures.2
Our paper is also related to the bandit (e.g., Rothschild (1974), McLennan (1984),
Easley and Kiefer (1988)) and self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) literatures, which
highlight that agents might optimally end up with incorrect beliefs if experimentation
is costly.3 We also allow beliefs to be incorrect due to insufficient feedback, but our
main contribution is to allow for misspecified learning. When players have misspecified
models, beliefs may be incorrect and endogenously depend on own actions even if there
is persistent experimentation; thus, an equilibrium framework is needed to characterize
steady-state behavior even in single-agent settings.4
From a technical perspective, we extend and combine results from two literatures.
First, the idea that equilibrium is a result of a learning process comes from the liter-
ature on learning in games. This literature studies explicit learning models to justify
Nash and SCE (e.g., Fudenberg and Kreps (1988), Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), Fu-
denberg and Kreps (1995), Fudenberg and Levine (1993b), Kalai and Lehrer (1993)).5
We extend this literature by allowing players to learn with models of the world that
are misspecified even in steady state.
Second, we rely on and contribute to the literature studying the limiting behavior
of Bayesian posteriors. The results from this literature have been applied to de-
cision problems with correctly specified agents (e.g., Easley and Kiefer, 1988). In
particular, an application of the martingale convergence theorem implies that beliefs
converge almost surely under the agent’s subjective prior. This result, however, does
not guarantee convergence of beliefs according to the true distribution if the agent has
a misspecified model and the support of her prior does not include the true distribu-
tion. Thus, we take a different route and follow the statistics literature on misspecified
learning. This literature characterizes limiting beliefs in terms of the Kullback-Leibler
divergence (e.g., Berk (1966), Bunke and Milhaud (1998)).6 We extend the statistics
2Some explanations for why players may have misspecified models include the use of heuristics
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973), complexity (Aragones et al., 2005), the desire to avoid over-fitting
the data (Al-Najjar (2009), Al-Najjar and Pai (2013)), and costly attention (Schwartzstein, 2009).
3In the macroeconomics literature, the term SCE is sometimes used in a broader sense to include
cases where agents have misspecified models (e.g., Sargent, 1999).
4Two extensions of SCE are also potentially applicable: restrictions on beliefs based on introspec-
tion (e.g., Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1994), and ambiguity aversion (Battigalli et al., 2012).
5See Fudenberg and Levine (1998, 2009) for a survey of this literature.
6White (1982) shows that the Kullback-Leibler divergence also characterizes the limiting behavior
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literature on misspecified learning to the case where agents are not only passively
learning about their environment but are also actively learning by taking actions.
We present the framework and examples in Section 2, discuss the relationship to
other solution concepts in Section 3, and provide a learning foundation in Section 4.
We discuss assumptions and extension in Section 5.
2 The framework
2.1 The environment
A (simultaneous-move) game G =< O,Q > is composed of a (simultaneous-move)
objective game O and a subjective model Q.
Objective game. A (simultaneous-move) objective game is a tuple
O = 〈I,Ω,S, p,X,Y, f, pi〉 ,
where: I is the set of players; Ω is the set of payoff-relevant states; S = ×i∈ISi is the
set of profiles of signals, where Si is the set of signals of player i; p is a probability
distribution over Ω× S, and, for simplicity, it is assumed to have marginals with full
support; we use standard notation to denote marginal and conditional distributions,
e.g., pΩ|Si(· | si) denotes the conditional distribution over Ω given Si = si; X = ×i∈IXi
is a set of profiles of actions, where Xi is the set of actions of player i; Y = ×i∈IYi
is a set of profiles of (observable) consequences, where Yi is the set of consequences
of player i; f = (f i)i∈I is a profile of feedback or consequence functions, where f i :
X× Ω→ Yi maps outcomes in Ω× X into consequences of player i; and pi = (pii)i∈I ,
where pii : Xi × Yi → R is the payoff function of player i.7 For simplicity, we prove
the results for the case where all of the above sets are finite.8
The timing of the objective game is as follows: First, a state and a profile of
signals are drawn according to p. Second, each player privately observes her own
signal. Third, players simultaneously choose actions. Finally, each player observes
her consequence and obtains a payoff. We implicitly assume that players observe at
of the maximum quasi-likelihood estimator.
7The concept of a feedback function is borrowed from the SCE literature. Also, while it is
redundant to have pii depend on xi, it simplifies the notation in applications.
8In the working paper version (Esponda and Pouzo, 2014), we provide technical conditions under
which the results extend to nonfinite Ω and Y.
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least their own actions and payoffs.9
A strategy of player i is a mapping σi : Si → ∆(Xi). The probability that player i
chooses action xi after observing signal si is denoted by σi(xi | si). A strategy profile
is a vector of strategies σ = (σi)i∈I ; let Σ denote the space of all strategy profiles.
Fix an objective game. For each strategy profile σ, there is an objective distri-
bution over player i’s consequences, Qiσ : Si × Xi → ∆(Yi), where
Qiσ(y
i | si, xi) =
∑
{(ω,x−i):f i(xi,x−i,ω)=yi}
∑
s−i
∏
j 6=i
σj(xj | sj)pΩ×S−i|Si(ω, s−i | si), (1)
for all (si, xi, yi) ∈ Si × Xi × Yi.10 The objective distribution represents the true
distribution over consequences, conditional on a player’s own action and signal, given
the objective game and a strategy profile followed by the players.
Subjective model. The subjective model represents the set of distributions
over consequences that players consider possible a priori. For a fixed objective game,
a subjective model is a tuple
Q = 〈Θ, (Qθ) θ∈Θ〉 ,
where Θ = ×i∈IΘi and Θi is player i’s parameter set; and Qθ = (Qiθi)i∈I , where
Qiθi : S
i × Xi → ∆(Yi) is the conditional distribution over player i’s consequences
parameterized by θi ∈ Θi; we denote the conditional distribution by Qθi(· | si, xi).11
While the objective game represents the true environment, the subjective model
represents the players’ perception of their environment. This separation between ob-
jective and subjective models is crucial in this paper.
Remark 1. A special case of a subjective model is one where each player understands
the objective game being played but is uncertain about the distribution over states,
the consequence function, and (in the case of multiple players) the strategies of other
players. In this special case, player i’s uncertainty about p, f i, and σ−i can be de-
scribed by a parametric model pθi , f
i
θi , σ
−i
θi
, where θi ∈ Θi. A subjective distribution
Qiθi is then derived by replacing p, f
i, and σ−i with pθi , f iθi , σ
−i
θi
in equation (1).12 
9See Online Appendix E for the case where players do not observe own payoffs.
10As usual, the superscript −i denotes a profile where the i’th component is excluded
11For simplicity, we assume that players know the distribution over own signals.
12In this case, a player understands that other players mix independently but, due to uncertainty
over the parameter θi that indexes σ−iθi = (σ
j
θi)j 6=i, she may have correlated beliefs about her oppo-
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By defining Qiθi as a primitive, we stress two points. First, this object is sufficient to
characterize behavior. Second, working with general subjective distributions allows for
more general types of misspecifications, where players do not even have to understand
the structural elements that determine their payoff relevant consequences.
We maintain the following assumptions about the subjective model.
Assumption 1. For all i ∈ I: (i) Θi is a compact subset of an Euclidean space,
(ii) Qiθi(y
i | si, xi) is continuous as a function of θi ∈ Θi for all (yi, si, xi) ∈ Yi×Si×Xi,
(iii) For all θi ∈ Θi, there exists a sequence (θin)n in Θi such that limn→∞ θin = θi and
such that, for all n, Qiθin(y
i | si, xi) > 0 for all (si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi, yi ∈ f i(xi,X−i, ω),
and ω ∈ supp(pΩ|Si(· | si)).
Conditions (i) and (ii) are the standard conditions used to define a parametric
model in statistics (e.g., Bickel et al. (1993)). Condition (iii) plays two roles. First,
it guarantees that there exists at least one parameter value that attaches positive
probability to every feasible observation. In particular, it rules out what can be viewed
as a stark misspecification in which every element of the subjective model attaches
zero probability to an event that occurs with positive true probability. Second, it
imposes a “richness” condition on the subjective model: If a feasible event is deemed
impossible by some parameter value, then that parameter value is not isolated in the
sense that there are nearby parameter values that consider every feasible event to be
possible. In Section 5, we show that equilibrium may fail to exist and steady-state
behavior need not be characterized by equilibrium without this assumption.
2.2 Examples
We illustrate the environment by presenting several examples that had previously not
been integrated into a common framework.13 In examples with a single agent, we drop
the i subscript from the notation.
Example 2.1. Monopolist with unknown demand . A monopolist faces
demand y = f(x, ω) = φ0(x) + ω, where x ∈ X is the price chosen by the monopolist
nents’ strategies, as in Fudenberg and Levine (1993a).
13Nyarko (1991) studies a special case of Example 2.1 and shows that a steady state does not
exist in pure strategies; Sobel (1984) considers a misspecification similar to Example 2.2; Tversky
and Kahneman’s (1973) story motivates Example 2.3; Sargent (1999, Chapter 7) studies Example
2.4; and Kagel and Levin (1986), Eyster and Rabin (2005), Jehiel and Koessler (2008), and Esponda
(2008) study Example 2.5. See Esponda and Pouzo (2014) for additional examples.
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and ω is a mean-zero shock with distribution p ∈ ∆(Ω). The monopolist observes
sales y, but not the shock. The monopolist does not observe any signal, and so we
omit signals from the notation. The monopolist’s payoff is pi(x, y) = xy (i.e., there are
no costs). The monopolist’s uncertainty about p and f is described by a parametric
model fθ, pθ, where y = fθ(x, ω) = a− bx+ ω is the demand function, θ = (a, b) ∈ Θ
is a parameter vector, and ω ∼ N(0, 1) (i.e., pθ is a standard normal distribution for
all θ ∈ Θ). In particular, this example corresponds to the special case discussed in
Remark 1, and Qθ(· | x) is a normal density with mean a− bx and unit variance. 
Example 2.2. Nonlinear taxation . An agent chooses effort x ∈ X at cost
c(x) and obtains income z = x + ω, where ω is a zero-mean shock with distribution
p ∈ ∆(Ω). The agent pays taxes t = τ(z), where τ(·) is a nonlinear tax schedule.
The agent does not observe any signal, and so we omit them. The agent observes
y = (z, t) and obtains payoff pi(x, z, t) = z − t − c(x).14 She understands how effort
translates into income but fails to realize that the marginal tax rate depends on
income. We compare two models that capture this misspecification. In model A, the
agent believes in a random coefficient model, t = (θA + ε)z, in which the marginal
and average tax rates are both equal to θA + ε, where θA ∈ ΘA = R. In model
B, the agent believes that t = θB1 + θ
B
2 z + ε, where θ
B
2 is the constant marginal
tax rate and θB = (θB1 , θ
B
2 ) ∈ ΘB = R2.15 In both models, ε ∼ N(0, 1) measures
uncertain aspects of the schedule (e.g., variations in tax rates or credits). Thus,
Qjθ(t, z | x) = Qjθ(t | z)p(z − x), where Qjθ(· | z) is a normal density with mean θAz
and variance z2 in model j = A and mean θB1 +θ
B
2 z and unit variance in model j = B.

Example 2.3. Regression to the mean . An instructor observes the initial
performance s of a student and decides to praise or criticize him, x ∈ {C,P}. The
student then performs again and the instructor observes his final performance, s′.
The truth is that performances y = (s, s′) are independent, standard normal random
variables. The instructor’s payoff is pi(x, s, s′) = s′ − c(x, s), where c(x, s) = κ |s| > 0
if either s > 0, x = C or s < 0, x = P , and, in all other cases, c(x, s) = 0.16 The
function c represents a (reputation) cost from lying (i.e., criticizing above-average
14Formally, f(x, ω) = (z(x, ω), t(x, ω)), where z(x, ω) = x+ ω and t(x, ω) = τ(x+ ω).
15It is not necessary to assume that ΘA and ΘB are compact for an equilibrium to exist; the same
comment applies to Examples 2.3 and 2.4
16Formally, ω = (s, s′), p is the product of standard normal distributions, and y = f(x, ω) = ω.
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performances or praising below-average ones) that increases in the size of the lie.
Because the instructor cannot influence performance, it is optimal to praise if s > 0
and to criticize if s < 0. The instructor, however, does not admit the possibility of
regression to the mean and believes that s′ = s + θx + ε, where ε ∼ N(0, 1), and
θ = (θC , θP ) ∈ Θ parameterizes her perceived influence on performance.17 Thus,
letting Q¯θ(· | x) be the a normal density with mean s+θx and unit variance, it follows
that Qθ(sˆ, s
′ | s, x) = Q¯θ(s′ | s, x) if sˆ = s and 0 otherwise. 
Example 2.4. Monetary policy . Two players, the government (G) and the
public (P), i.e., I = {G,P}, choose monetary policy xG and inflation forecasts xP ,
respectively. They do not observe signals, and so we omit them. Inflation, e, and
unemployment, U , are determined by18
e = xG + εe (2)
U = u∗ − λ(e− xP ) + εU , (3)
where u∗ > 0, λ ∈ (0, 1) and ω = (εe, εU) ∈ Ω = R2 are shocks with a full support
distribution p ∈ ∆(Ω) and V ar(εe) > 0. The public and the government observe
realized inflation and unemployment, but not the error terms. The government’s
payoff is pi(xG, e, U) = −(U2 + e2). For simplicity, we focus on the government’s
problem and assume that the public has correct beliefs and chooses xP = xG. The
government understands how its policy xG affects inflation, but does not realize that
unemployment is affected by surprise inflation:
U = θ1 − θ2e+ εU . (4)
The subjective model is parameterized by θ = (θ1, θ2) ∈ Θ, and it follows thatQθ(e, U |
xG) is the density implied by the equations (2) and (4). 
Example 2.5. Trade with adverse selection. A buyer with valuation v ∈ V
and a seller submit a (bid) price x ∈ X and an ask price a ∈ A, respectively. The
seller’s ask price and the buyer’s value are drawn from p ∈ ∆(A×V), so that Ω = A×V
17A model that allows for regression to the mean is s′ = αs+ θx + ε; in this case, the agent would
correctly learn that α = 0 and θx = 0 for all x. Rabin and Vayanos (2010) study a related setup in
which the agent believes that shocks are autoregressive when in fact they are i.i.d.
18Formally, ω = (εe, εU ) and y = (e, U) = f(x
G, xP , ω) is given by equations (2) and (3).
8
is the state space. Thus, the buyer is the only decision maker.19 After submitting a
price, the buyer observes y = ω = (a, v) and gets payoff pi(x, a, v) = v − x if a ≤ x
and zero otherwise. In other words, the buyer observes perfect feedback, gets v− x if
there is trade, and 0 otherwise. When making an offer, she does not know her value
or the seller’s ask price. She also does not observe any signals, and so we omit them.
Finally, suppose that A and V are correlated but that the buyer believes they are
independent. This is captured by letting Qθ = θ and Θ = ∆(A)×∆(V). 
2.3 Definition of equilibrium
Distance to true model. In equilibrium, we will require players’ beliefs to put
probability one on the set of subjective distributions over consequences that are “clos-
est” to the objective distribution. The following function, which we call the weighted
Kullback-Leibler divergence (wKLD) function of player i, is a weighted version of
the standard Kullback-Leibler divergence in statistics (Kullback and Leibler, 1951). It
represents a “distance” between the objective distribution over i’s consequences given
a strategy profile σ ∈ Σ and the distribution as parameterized by θi ∈ Θi:20
Ki(σ, θi) =
∑
(si,xi)∈Si×Xi
EQiσ(·|si,xi)
[
ln
Qiσ(Y
i | si, xi)
Qi
θi
(Y i | si, xi)
]
σi(xi | si)pSi(si). (5)
The set of closest parameter values of player i given σ is the set
Θi(σ) ≡ arg min
θi∈Θi
Ki(σ, θi).
The interpretation is that Θi(σ) ⊂ Θi is the set of parameter values that player i can
believe to be possible after observing feedback consistent with strategy profile σ.
Remark 2. We show in Section 4 that wKLD is the right notion of distance in a
learning model with Bayesian players. Here, we provide an heuristic argument for
a Bayesian agent (we drop i subscripts for clarity) with parameter set Θ = {θ1, θ2}
who observes data over t periods, (sτ , xτ , yτ )
t−1
τ=0, that comes from repeated play of
19The typical story is that there is a population of sellers each of whom follows the weakly dominant
strategy of asking for her valuation; thus, the ask price is a function of the seller’s valuation and, if
buyer and seller valuations are correlated, then the ask price and buyer valuation are also correlated.
20The notation EQ denotes expectation with respect to the probability distribution Q. Also, we
use the convention that − ln 0 =∞ and 0 ln 0 = 0.
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the objective game under strategy σ. Let ρ0 = µ0(θ2)/µ0(θ1) denote the agent’s ratio
of priors. Applying Bayes’ rule and simple algebra, the posterior probability over θ1
after t periods is
µt(θ1) =
(
1 + ρ0Π
t−1
τ=0
Qθ2(yτ | sτ , xτ )
Qθ1(yτ | sτ , xτ )
)−1
=
(
1 + ρ0Π
t−1
τ=0
Qθ2(yτ | sτ , xτ )/Qσ(yτ | sτ , xτ )
Qθ1(yτ | sτ , xτ )/Qσ(yτ | sτ , xτ )
)−1
=
(
1 + ρ0 exp
{
−t
(
1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
ln
Qσ(yτ | sτ , xτ )
Qθ2(yτ | sτ , xτ )
− 1
t
t−1∑
τ=0
ln
Qσ(yτ | sτ , xτ )
Qθ1(yτ | sτ , xτ )
)})−1
where the second equality follows by multiplying and dividing by Πt−1τ=0Qσ(yτ | sτ , xτ ).
By a law of large numbers argument and the fact that the true joint distribution
over (s, x, y) is given by Qσ(y | x, s)σ(x | s)pS(s), the difference in the log-likelihood
ratios converges to K(σ, θ2) − K(σ, θ1). Suppose that K(σ, θ1) > K(σ, θ2). Then,
for sufficiently large t, the posterior belief µt(θ1) is approximately equal to 1/(1 +
ρ0 exp (−t (K(σ, θ2)−K(σ, θ1)))), which converges to 0. Therefore, the posterior even-
tually assigns zero probability to θ1. On the other hand, if K(σ, θ1) < K(σ, θ2), then
the posterior eventually assigns zero probability to θ2. Thus, the posterior eventually
assigns zero probability to parameter values that do not minimize K(σ, ·). 
Remark 3. Because the wKLD function is weighted by a player’s own strategy, it places
no restrictions on beliefs about outcomes that only arise following out-of-equilibrium
actions (beyond the restrictions imposed by Θ). 
The next result collects some useful properties of the wKLD function.
Lemma 1. (i) For all i ∈ I, θi ∈ Θi, and σ ∈ Σ, Ki(σ, θi) ≥ 0, with equality holding
if and only if Qθi(· | si, xi) = Qiσ(· | si, xi) for all (si, xi) such that σi(xi | si) > 0. (ii)
For all i ∈ I, Θi(·) is nonempty, upper hemicontinuous, and compact valued.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The upper-hemicontinuity of Θi(·) would follow from the Theorem of the Maximum
had we assumed Qiθi to be positive for all feasible events and θ
i ∈ Θi, since the wKLD
function would then be finite and continuous. But this assumption may be strong in
some cases.21 Assumption 1(iii) weakens this assumption by requiring that it holds
for a dense subset of Θ, and still guarantees that Θi(·) is upper hemicontinuous.
21For example, it rules out cases where a player believes others follow pure strategies.
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Optimality. In equilibrium, we will require each player to choose a strategy that
is optimal given her beliefs. A strategy σi for player i is optimal given µi ∈ ∆(Θi) if
σi(xi | si) > 0 implies that
xi ∈ arg max
x¯i∈Xi
EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,x¯i)
[
pii(x¯i, Y i)
]
(6)
where Q¯iµi(· | si, xi) =
´
Θi
Qiθi(· | si, xi)µi(dθi) is the distribution over consequences of
player i, conditional on (si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi, induced by µi.
Definition of equilibrium. We propose the following solution concept.
Definition 1. A strategy profile σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of game G if, for
all players i ∈ I, there exists µi ∈ ∆(Θi) such that
(i) σi is optimal given µi, and
(ii) µi ∈ ∆(Θi(σ)), i.e., if θˆi is in the support of µi, then
θˆi ∈ arg min
θi∈Θi
Ki(σ, θi).
Definition 1 places two restrictions on equilibrium behavior: (i) optimization given
beliefs, and (ii) endogenous restrictions on beliefs. For comparison, note that the
definition of Nash equilibrium is identical to Definition 1 except that condition (ii) is
replaced with the condition that players have correct beliefs, i.e., Q¯iµi = Q
i
σ.
existence of equilibrium. The standard existence proof of Nash equilibrium
cannot be used here because the analogous version of a best response correspondence
is not necessarily convex valued. To prove existence, we first perturb payoffs and
establish that equilibrium exists in the perturbed game. We then consider a sequence
of equilibria of perturbed games, where perturbations go to zero, and establish that
the limit is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of the (unperturbed) game.22 The nonstandard
part of the proof is to prove existence of equilibrium in the perturbed game. The
perturbed best response correspondence is still not necessarily convex valued. Our
approach is to characterize equilibrium as a fixed point of a belief correspondence and
show that it satisfies the requirements of a generalized version of Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem.
22The idea of perturbations and the strategy of the existence proof date back to Harsanyi (1973);
Selten (1975) and Kreps and Wilson (1982) also used these ideas to prove existence of perfect and
sequential equilibrium, respectively.
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Theorem 1. Every game has at least one Berk-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. See the Appendix.
2.4 Examples: Finding a Berk-Nash equilibrium
Example 2.1, continued from pg. 6. Monopolist with unknown demand .
Let σ = (σx)x∈X denote a strategy, where σx is the probability of choosing price x ∈ X.
Because this is a single-agent problem, the objective distribution does not depend on
σ; hence, we denote it by Q0(· | x), which is a normal density with mean φ0(x) and
unit variance. Similarly, Qθ(· | x) is a normal density with mean φθ(x) = a− bx and
unit variance. It follows from equation (5) that
K(σ, θ) =
∑
x∈X
σx
1
2
EQ0(·|x)
[
(Y − φθ(x))2 − (Y − φ0(x))2
]
=
∑
x∈X
σx
1
2
(φ0(x)− φθ(x))2 .
For concreteness, let X = {2, 10}, φ0(2) = 34 and φ0(10) = 2, and Θ = [33, 40] ×
[3, 3.5].23 Let θ0 ∈ R2 provide a perfect fit for demand, i.e., φθ0(x) = φ0(x) for all
x ∈ X. In this example, θ0 = (a0, b0) = (42, 4) /∈ Θ and, therefore, we say that the
monopolist has a misspecified model. The dashed line in Figure 1 depicts optimal
behavior: the optimal price is 10 to the left, it is 2 to the right, and the monopolist is
indifferent for parameter values on the dashed line.
To solve for equilibrium, we first consider pure strategies. If σ = (0, 1) (i.e., the
price is x = 10), the first order conditions ∂K(σ, θ)/∂a = ∂K(σ, θ)/∂b = 0 imply
φ0(10) = φθ(10) = a − b10, and any (a, b) ∈ Θ on the segment AB in Figure 1
minimizes K(σ, ·). These minimizers, however, lie to the right of the dashed line,
where it is not optimal to set a price of 10. Thus, σ = (0, 1) is not an equilibrium.
A similar argument establishes that σ = (1, 0) is not an equilibrium: If it were, the
minimizer would be at D, where it is in fact not optimal to choose a price of 2.
Finally, consider mixed strategies. Because both first order conditions cannot hold
simultaneously, the parameter value that minimizes K(σ, θ) lies on the boundary of Θ.
A bit of algebra shows that, for any totally mixed σ, there is a unique minimizer θσ =
(aσ, bσ) characterized as follows. If σ2 ≤ 3/4, the minimizer is on the segment BC:
23In particular, the deterministic part of the demand function can have any functional form pro-
vided it passes through (2, φo(2)) and (10, φ0(10)).
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Figure 1: Monopolist with misspecified demand function.
Left panel: the parameter value that minimizes the wKLD function given strategy σˆ is θσˆ.
Right panel: σ∗ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium (σ∗ is optimal given θσ∗—because θσ∗ lies on
the indifference line—and θσ∗ minimizes the wKLD function given σ
∗).
bσ = 3.5 and aσ = 4σ2 + 37 solves ∂K(σ, θ)/∂a = 0. The left panel of Figure 1 depicts
an example where the unique minimizer θσˆ under strategy σˆ is given by the tangency
between the contour lines of K(σˆ, ·) and the feasible set Θ.24 If σ2 ∈ [3/4, 15/16], then
θσ = C is the northeast vertex of Θ. Finally, if σ2 > 15/16, the minimizer is on the
segment DC: aσ = 40 and bσ = (380− 368σ2)/(100− 96σ2) solves ∂K(σ, θ)/∂b = 0.
Because the monopolist mixes, optimality requires that the equilibrium belief θσ
lies on the dashed line. The unique Berk-Nash equilibrium is σ∗ = (35/36, 1/36),
and its supporting belief, θσ∗ = (40, 10/3), is given by the intersection of the dashed
line and the segment DC, as depicted in the right panel of Figure 1. It is not the
case, however, that the equilibrium belief about the mean of Y is correct. Thus, an
approach that had focused on fitting the mean, rather than minimizing K, would have
led to the wrong conclusion.25 
24It can be shown that K(σ, θ) =
(
θ − θ0)′Mσ (θ − θ0), where Mσ is a weighting matrix that
depends on σ. In particular, the contour lines of K(σ, ·) are ellipses.
25The example also illustrates the importance of mixed strategies for existence of Berk-Nash equi-
librium, even in single-agent settings. As an antecedent, Esponda and Pouzo (2011) argue that this
is the reason why mixed strategy equilibrium cannot be purified in a voting application.
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Example 2.2, continued from pg. 7. Nonlinear taxation. For any pure
strategy x and parameter value θ ∈ ΘA = R (model A) or θ ∈ ΘB = R2 (model B),
the wKLD function Kj(x, θ) for model j ∈ {A,B} equals
E
[
ln
Q(T | Z)p(Z − x)
Qjθ(T | Z)p(Z − x)
| X = x
]
=
−
1
2
E
[(
τ(Z)/Z − θA)2 | X = x]+ CA (model A)
−1
2
E
[(
τ(Z)− θB1 − θB2 Z
)2 | X = x]+ CB (model B)
where E denotes the true conditional expectation and CA and CB are constants.
For model A, θA(x) = E [τ(x+W )/(x+W )] is the unique parameter that mini-
mizes KA(x, ·).26 Intuitively, the agent believes that the expected marginal tax rate
is equal to the true expected average tax rate. For model B,
θB2 (x) = Cov(τ(x+W ), x+W )/V ar(x+W ) = E [τ
′(x+W )] ,
where the second equality follows from Stein’s lemma (Stein (1972)), provided that τ
is differentiable. Intuitively, the agent believes that the marginal tax rate is constant
and given by the true expected marginal tax rate.27
We now compare equilibrium under these two models with the case in which the
agent has correct beliefs and chooses an optimal strategy xopt that maximizes x −
E[τ(x+W )]− c(x). In contrast, a strategy xj∗ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of model j
if and only if x = xj∗ maximizes x− θj(xj∗)x− c(x).
For example, suppose that the cost of effort and true tax schedule are both smooth
functions, increasing and convex (e.g., taxes are progressive) and that X ⊂ R is a
compact interval. Then first order conditions are sufficient for optimality, and xopt
is the unique solution to 1 − E[τ ′(xopt + W )] = c′(xopt). Moreover, the unique Berk-
Nash equilibrium solves 1 − E [τ(xA∗ +W )/(xA∗ +W )] = c′(xA∗ ) for model A and
1− E[τ ′(xB∗ + W )] = c′(xB∗ ) for model B. In particular, effort in model B is optimal,
xB∗ = x
opt. Intuitively, the agent has correct beliefs about the true expected marginal
tax rate at her equilibrium choice of effort, and so she has the right incentives on
the margin, despite believing incorrectly that the marginal tax rate is constant. In
contrast, effort is higher than optimal in model A, xA∗ > x
opt. Intuitively, the agent
26We use W to denote the random variable that takes on realizations ω.
27By linearity and normality, the minimizers of KB(x, ·) coincide with the OLS estimands. We
assume normality for tractability, although the framework allows for general distributional assump-
tions. There are other tractable distributions; for example, the minimizer of wKLD under the Laplace
distribution corresponds to the estimates of a median (not a linear) regression.
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believes that the expected marginal tax rate equals the true expected average tax rate,
which is lower than the true expected marginal tax rate in a progressive system.
Example 2.3, continued from pg. 7. Regression to the mean . Since
optimal strategies are characterized by a cutoff, we let σ ∈ R represent the strategy
where the instructor praises an initial performance if it is above σ and criticizes it
otherwise. The wKLD function for any θ ∈ Θ = R2 is
K(σ, θ) =
ˆ σ
−∞
E
[
ln
ϕ(S2)
ϕ(S2 − (θC + s1))
]
ϕ(s1)ds1+
ˆ ∞
σ
E
[
ln
ϕ(S2)
ϕ(S2 − (θP + s1))
]
ϕ(s1)ds1,
where ϕ is the density of N(0, 1) and E denotes the true expectation. For each σ, the
unique parameter vector that minimizes K(σ, ·) is
θC(σ) = E [S2 − S1 | S1 < σ] = −E [S1 | S1 < σ] > 0
and, similarly, θP (σ) = −E [S1 | S1 > σ] < 0. Intuitively, the instructor is critical for
performances below a threshold and, therefore, the mean performance conditional on
a student being criticized is lower than the unconditional mean performance; thus, a
student who is criticized delivers a better next performance in expectation. Similarly,
a student who is praised delivers a worse next performance in expectation.
The instructor who follows a strategy cutoff σ believes, after observing initial
performance s1 > 0, that her expected payoff is s1+θC(σ)−κs1 if she criticizes and s1+
θP (σ) if she praises. By optimality, the cutoff makes her indifferent between praising
and criticizing. Thus, σ∗ = (1/κ) (θC(σ∗)− θP (σ∗)) > 0 is the unique equilibrium
cutoff. An instructor who ignores regression to the mean has incorrect beliefs about
the influence of her feedback on the student’s performance: She is excessively critical
in equilibrium because she incorrectly believes that criticizing a student improves
performance and that praising a student worsens it. Moreover, as the reputation cost
κ → 0, meaning that instructors care only about performance and not about lying,
σ∗ →∞: instructors only criticize (as in Tversky and Kahneman’s (1973) story). 
3 Relationship to other solution concepts
We show that Berk-Nash equilibrium includes several solution concepts (both standard
and boundedly rational) as special cases.
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3.1 Properties of games
correctly-specified games. In Bayesian statistics, a model is correctly specified
if the support of the prior includes the true data generating process. The extension to
single-agent decision problems is straightforward. In games, however, we must account
for the fact that the objective distribution over consequences (i.e., the true model)
depends on the strategy profile.28
Definition 2. A game is correctly specified given σ if, for all i ∈ I, there exists
θi ∈ Θi such that Qiθi(· | si, xi) = Qiσ (· | si, xi) for all for all (si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi;
otherwise, the game is misspecified given σ. A game is correctly specified if it
is correctly specified for all σ; otherwise, it is misspecified.
identification. From the player’s perspective, what matters is identification of
the distribution over consequences Qiθ, not the parameter θ. If the model is correctly
specified, then the true Qiσ is trivially identified. Of course, this is not true if the model
is misspecified, because the true distribution will never be learned. But we want a
definition that captures the same spirit: If two distributions are judged to be equally
a best fit (given the true distribution), then we want these two distributions to be
identical; otherwise, we cannot identify which distribution is a best fit. The fact that
players take actions introduces an additional nuance to the definition of identification.
We can ask for identification of the distribution over consequences either for those
actions that are taken by the player (i.e., on the path of play) or for all actions (i.e.,
on and off the path).
Definition 3. A game is weakly identified given σ if, for all i ∈ I: if θi1, θi2 ∈ Θi(σ),
then Qi
θi1
(· | si, xi) = Qi
θi2
(· | si, xi) for all (si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi such that σi(xi | si) > 0
(recall that pSi has full support). If the condition is satisfied for all (s
i, xi) ∈ Si ×Xi,
then we say that the game is strongly identified given σ. A game is [weakly or
strongly] identified if it is [weakly or strongly] identified for all σ.
A correctly specified game is weakly identified. Also, two games that are identical
except for their feedback may differ in terms of being correctly specified or identified.
28It would be more precise to say that the game is correctly specified in steady state.
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3.2 Relationship to Nash and self-confirming equilibrium
The next result shows that Berk-Nash equilibrium is equivalent to Nash equilibrium
when the game is both correctly specified and strongly identified.
Proposition 1. (i) Suppose that the game is correctly specified given σ and that σ
is a Nash equilibrium of its objective game. Then σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of
the (objective and subjective) game; (ii) Suppose that σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of
a game that is correctly specified and strongly identified given σ. Then σ is a Nash
equilibrium of the corresponding objective game.
Proof. (i) Let σ be a Nash equilibrium and fix any i ∈ I. Then σi is optimal given
Qiσ. Because the game is correctly specified given σ, there exists θ
i
∗ ∈ Θi such that
Qiθi∗ = Q
i
σ and, therefore, by Lemma 1, θ
i
∗ ∈ Θi(σ). Thus, σi is also optimal given
Qiθi∗ and θ
i
∗ ∈ Θi(σ), so that σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium. (ii) Let σ be a Berk-Nash
equilibrium and fix any i ∈ I. Then σi is optimal given Q¯iµi , for some µi ∈ ∆(Θi(σ)).
Because the game is correctly specified given σ, there exists θi∗ ∈ Θi such that Qiθi∗ =
Qiσ and, therefore, by Lemma 1, θ
i
∗ ∈ Θi(σ). Moreover, because the game is strongly
identified given σ, any θˆi ∈ Θi(σ) satisfies Qi
θˆi
= Qiθi∗ = Q
i
σ. Then σ
i is also optimal
given Qiσ. Thus, σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Example 2.4, continued from pg. 8. Monetary policy . Fix a strategy xP∗
for the public. Note that U = u∗ − λ(xG − xP∗ + εe) + εU , whereas the government
believes U = θ1 − θ2(xG + εe) + εU . Thus, by choosing θ∗ ∈ Θ = R2 such that
θ∗1 = u
∗+λxP∗ and θ
∗
2 = λ, it follows that the distribution over Y = (U, e) parameterized
by θ∗ coincides with the objective distribution given xP∗ . So, despite appearances, the
game is correctly specified given xP∗ . Moreover, since V ar(εe) > 0, θ
∗ is the unique
minimizer of the wKLD function given xP∗ . Because there is a unique minimizer,
then the game is strongly identified given xP∗ . Since these properties hold for all x
P
∗ ,
Proposition 1 implies that Berk-Nash equilibrium is equivalent to Nash equilibrium.
Thus, the equilibrium policies are the same whether or not the government realizes
that unemployment is driven by surprise, not actual, inflation.29 
29Sargent (1999) derived this result for a government doing OLS-based learning (a special case
of our example when errors are normal). We assumed linearity for simplicity, but the result is
true for the more general case with true unemployment U = fU (xG, xP , ω) and subjective model
fUθ (x
G, xP , ω) if, for all xP , there exists θ such that fU (xG, xP , ω) = fUθ (x
G, xP , ω) for all (xP , ω).
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The next result shows that a Berk-Nash equilibrium is a self-confirming equilibrium
(SCE) in games that are correctly specified, but not necessarily strongly identified.30
Proposition 2. Suppose that the game is correctly specified given σ, and that σ is a
Berk-Nash equilibrium. Then σ is also a self-confirming equilibrium.31
Proof. Fix any i ∈ I and let θˆi be in the support of µi, where µi is player i’s belief
supporting the Berk-Nash equilibrium strategy σi. Because the game is correctly
specified given σ, there exists θi∗ ∈ Θi such that Qiθi∗ = Qiσ and, therefore, by Lemma
1, Ki(σ, θi∗) = 0. Thus, it must also be that K
i(σ, θˆi) = 0. By Lemma 1, it follows
that Qi
θˆi
(· | si, xi) = Qiσ(· | si, xi) for all (si, xi) such that σi(xi | si) > 0. In particular,
σi is optimal given Qi
θˆi
, and Qi
θˆi
satisfies the desired self-confirming restriction.
For games that are not correctly specified, beliefs can be incorrect on the equilib-
rium path, and so a Berk-Nash equilibrium is not necessarily Nash or SCE.
3.3 Relationship to fully cursed and ABEE
An analogy-based game satisfies the following four properties: (i) States and in-
formation structure: The state space Ω is finite with distribution pΩ ∈ ∆(Ω). In
addition, for each i, there is a partition S i of Ω, and the element of S i that contains ω
(i.e., the signal of player i in state ω) is denoted by si(ω);32 (ii) Perfect feedback : For
each i, f i(x, ω) = (x−i, ω) for all (x, ω); (iii) Analogy partition: For each i, there exists
a partition of Ω, denoted by Ai, and the element of Ai that contains ω is denoted
by αi(ω); (iv) Conditional independence: (Qiθi)θi∈Θi is the set of all joint probability
distributions over X−i × Ω that satisfy
Qiθi
(
x−i, ω | si(ω′), xi) = QiΩ,θi(ω | si(ω′))QiX−i,θi(x−i | αi(ω)).
30A strategy profile σ is a SCE if, for all players i ∈ I, σi is optimal given Qˆiσ, where Qˆiσ(· | si, xi) =
Qiσ(· | si, xi) for all (si, xi) such that σi(xi | si) > 0. This definition is slightly more general than the
typical one, e.g., Dekel et al. (2004), because it does not restrict players to believe that consequences
are driven by other players’ strategies.
31A converse does not necessarily hold for a fixed game. The reason is that the definition of SCE
does not impose any restrictions on off-equilibrium beliefs, while a particular subjective game may
impose ex-ante restrictions on beliefs. The following converse, however, does hold: For any σ that is
an SCE, there exists a game that is correctly specified for which σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium.
32This assumption is made to facilitate comparison with Jehiel and Koessler’s (2008) ABEE.
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In other words, every player i believes that x−i and ω are independent conditional on
the analogy partition. For example, if Ai = S i for all i, then each player believes that
the actions of other players are independent of the state, conditional on their own
private information.
Definition 4. (Jehiel and Koessler, 2008) A strategy profile σ is an analogy-based ex-
pectation equilibrium (ABEE) if for all i ∈ I, ω ∈ Ω, and xi such that σi(xi | si(ω)) >
0, xi ∈ arg maxx¯i∈Xi
∑
ω′∈Ω pΩ|Si(ω
′ | si(ω))∑x−i∈X−i σ¯−i(x−i | ω′)pii(x¯i, x−i, ω′), where
σ¯−i(x−i | ω′) = ∑ω′′∈Ω pΩ|Ai(ω′′ | αi(ω′))∏j 6=i σj(xj | sj(ω′′)).
Proposition 3. In an analogy-based game, σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium if and only
if it is an ABEE.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As mentioned by Jehiel and Koessler (2008), ABEE is equivalent to Eyster and
Rabin’s (2005) fully cursed equilibrium in the special case where Ai = S i for all i.
In particular, Proposition 3 provides a misspecified-learning foundation for these two
solution concepts. Jehiel and Koessler (2008) discuss an alternative foundation for
ABEE, where players receive coarse feedback aggregated over past play and multiple
beliefs are consistent with this feedback. Under this different feedback structure,
ABEE can be viewed as a natural selection of the set of SCE.
Example 2.5, continued from pg. 8. Trade with adverse selection. In
Online Appendix A, we show that x∗ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium price if and only
if x = x∗ maximizes an equilibrium belief function Π(x, x∗) which represents the
belief about expected profit from choosing any price x under a steady-state x∗. The
equilibrium belief function depends on the feedback/misspecification assumptions, and
we discuss the following four cases:
ΠNE(x) = Pr(A ≤ x) (E [V | A ≤ x]− x)
ΠCE(x) = Pr(A ≤ x) (E [V ]− x)
ΠBE(x, x∗) = Pr(A ≤ x) (E [V | A ≤ x∗]− x)
ΠABEE(x) =
k∑
j=1
Pr(V ∈ Vj) {Pr(A ≤ x | V ∈ Vj) (E [V | V ∈ Vj]− x)} .
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The first case, ΠNE, is the benchmark case in which beliefs are correct. The second
case, ΠCE, corresponds to perfect feedback and subjective model Θ = ∆(A)×∆(V),
as described in page 8. This is an example of an analogy-based game with single
analogy class V. The buyer learns the true marginal distributions of A and V and
believes the joint distribution equals the product of the marginal distributions. Berk-
Nash coincides with fully cursed equilibrium. The third case, ΠBE, has the same
misspecified model as the second case, but assumes partial feedback, in the sense that
the ask price a is always observed but the valuation v is only observed if there is trade.
The equilibrium price x∗ affects the sample of valuations observed by the buyer and,
therefore, her beliefs. Berk-Nash coincides with naive behavioral equilibrium.
The last case, ΠABEE, corresponds to perfect feedback and the following misspec-
ification: Consider a partition of V into k “analogy classes” (Vj)j=1,...,k. The buyer
believes that (A, V ) are independent conditional on V ∈ Vi, for each i = 1, ..., k. The
parameter set is ΘA = ×j∆(A)×∆(V), where, for a value θ = (θ1, ...., θk, θV) ∈ ΘA, θV
parameterizes the marginal distribution over V and, for each j = 1, ..., k, θj ∈ ∆(A)
parameterizes the distribution over A conditional on V ∈ Vj. Berk-Nash coincides
with the ABEE of the game with analogy classes (Vj)j=1,...,k.33 
4 Equilibrium foundation
We provide a learning foundation for equilibrium. We follow Fudenberg and Kreps
(1993) in considering games with (slightly) perturbed payoffs because, as they high-
light in the context of providing a learning foundation for mixed-strategy Nash equi-
librium, behavior need not be continuous in beliefs without perturbations. Thus, even
if beliefs were to converge, behavior need not settle down in the unperturbed game.
Perturbations guarantee that if beliefs converge, then behavior also converges.
4.1 Perturbed game
A perturbation structure is a tuple P = 〈Ξ, Pξ〉, where: Ξ = ×i∈IΞi and Ξi ⊆ R#Xi
is a set of payoff perturbations for each action of player i; Pξ = (Pξi)i∈I , where
Pξi ∈ ∆(Ξi) is a distribution over payoff perturbations of player i that is absolutely
continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, satisfies
´
Ξi
||ξi||Pξ(dξi) < ∞,
33In Online Appendix A, we also consider the case of ABEE with partial feedback.
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and is independent from the perturbations of other players. A perturbed game
GP = 〈G,P〉 is composed of a game G and a perturbation structure P . The timing
of a perturbed game GP coincides with the timing of G, except for two differences.
First, before taking an action, each player not only observes her signal si but also
privately observes a vector of own-payoff perturbations ξi ∈ Ξi, where ξi(xi) denotes
the perturbation for action xi. Second, her payoff given action xi and consequence yi
is pii(xi, yi) + ξi(xi).
A strategy σi for player i is optimal in the perturbed game given µi ∈ ∆(Θi)
if, for all (si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi, σi(xi | si) = Pξ (ξi : xi ∈ Ψi(µi, si, ξi)), where
Ψi(µi, si, ξi) ≡ arg max
xi∈Xi
EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,xi)
[
pii(xi, Y i)
]
+ ξi(xi).
In other words, if σi is an optimal strategy, then σi(xi | si) is the probability that
xi is optimal when the state is si and the perturbation is ξi, taken over all possible
realizations of ξi. The definition of Berk-Nash equilibrium of a perturbed game GP is
analogous to Definition 1, with the only difference that optimality must be required
with respect to the perturbed game.
4.2 Learning foundation
We fix a perturbed game GP and assume that players repeatedly play the correspond-
ing objective game at each t = 0, 1, 2, ..., where the time-t state and signals, (ωt, st),
and perturbations ξt, are independently drawn every period from the same distribution
p and Pξ, respectively. In addition, each player i has a prior µ
i
0 with full support over
her (finite-dimensional) parameter set, Θi.34 At the end of every period t, each player
uses Bayes’ rule and the information obtained in all past periods (her own signals, ac-
tions, and consequences) to update beliefs. Players believe that they face a stationary
environment and myopically maximize the current period’s expected payoff.
Let ∆0(Θi) denote the set of probability distributions on Θi with full support. Let
Bi : ∆0(Θi)× Si×Xi×Yi → ∆0(Θi) denote the Bayesian operator of player i: for all
34We restrict attention to parametric models (i.e., finite-dimensional parameter spaces) because,
otherwise, Bayesian updating need not converge to the truth for most priors and parameter values
even in correctly specified statistical settings (Freedman (1963), Diaconis and Freedman (1986)).
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A ⊆ Θ Borel measurable and all (µi, si, xi, yi) ∈ ∆0(Θi)× Si × Xi × Yi,
Bi(µi, si, xi, yi)(A) =
´
A
Qiθi(y
i | si, xi)µi(dθ)´
Θ
Qi
θi
(yi | si, xi)µi(dθ) .
Bayesian updating is well defined by Assumption 1.35 Because players believe they
face a stationary environment with i.i.d. perturbations, it is without loss of generality
to restrict player i’s behavior at time t to depend on (µit, s
i
t, ξ
i
t).
Definition 5. A policy of player i is a sequence of functions φi = (φit)t, where
φit : ∆(Θ
i)×Si×Ξi → Xi. A policy φi is optimal if φit ∈ Ψi for all t. A policy profile
φ = (φi)i∈I is optimal if φi is optimal for all i ∈ I.
Let H ⊆ (S × Ξ × X × Y)∞ denote the set of histories, where any history h =
(s0, ξ0, x0, y0, ..., st, ξt, xt, yt...) ∈ H satisfies the feasibility restriction: for all i ∈ I,
yit = f
i(xit, x
−i
t , ω) for some ω ∈ supp(pΩ|Si(· | sit)) for all t. Let Pµ0,φ denote the
probability distribution over H that is induced by the priors µ0 = (µi0)i∈I , and the
policy profiles φ = (φi)i∈I . Let (µt)t denote the sequence of beliefs µt : H→ ×i∈I∆(Θi)
such that, for all t ≥ 1 and all i ∈ I, µit is the posterior at time t defined recursively
by µit(h) = B
i(µit−1(h), s
i
t−1(h), x
i
t−1(h), y
i
t−1(h)) for all h ∈ H, where sit−1(h) is player
i’s signal at t− 1 given history h, and similarly for xit−1(h) and yit−1(h).
Definition 6. The sequence of intended strategy profiles given policy profile
φ = (φi)i∈I is the sequence (σt)t of random variables σt : H→ ×i∈I∆(Xi)Si such that,
for all t, all i ∈ I, and all (xi, si) ∈ Xi × Si,
σit(h)(x
i | si) = Pξ
(
ξi : φit(µ
i
t(h), s
i, ξi) = xi
)
. (7)
An intended strategy profile σt describes how each player would behave at time
t for each possible signal; it is a random variable because it depends on the players’
beliefs at time t, µt, which in turn depend on the past history.
35By Assumption 1(ii)-(iii), there exists θ ∈ Θ and an open ball containing it, such that Qiθ′ > 0
for any θ′ in the ball. Thus the Bayesian operator is well-defined for any µi ∈ ∆0(Θi). Moreover, by
Assumption 1(iii), such θ’s are dense in Θ, so the Bayesian operator maps ∆0(Θi) into itself.
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One reasonable criteria to claim that the players’ behavior stabilizes is that their
intended behavior stabilizes with positive probability (cf. Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993).
Definition 7. A strategy profile σ is stable [or strongly stable] under policy profile
φ if the sequence of intended strategies, (σt)t, converges to σ with positive probability
[or with probability one], i.e.,
Pµ0,φ
(
lim
t→∞
‖σt(h)− σ‖ = 0
)
> 0 [or = 1].
Lemma 2 says that, if behavior stabilizes to a strategy profile σ, then, for each
player i, beliefs become increasingly concentrated on Θi(σ). This result extends find-
ings from the statistics of misspecified learning (Berk (1966), Bunke and Milhaud
(1998)) to a setting with active learning (i.e., players learn from data that is endoge-
nously generated by their own actions). Three new issues arise: (i) Previous results
need to be extended to the case of non-i.i.d. and endogenous data; (ii) It is not ob-
vious that steady-state beliefs can be characterized based on steady-state behavior,
independently of the path of play (Assumption 1 plays an important role here; See
Section 5 for an example); (iii) We allow the wKLD function to be nonfinite so that
players can believe that other players follow pure strategies.36
Lemma 2. Suppose that, for a policy profile φ, the sequence of intended strategies,
(σt)t, converges to σ for all histories in a set H ⊆ H such that Pµ0,φ (H) > 0. Then,
for all open sets U i ⊇ Θi(σ), limt→∞ µit (U i) = 1, a.s.-Pµ0,φ in H.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The sketch of the proof of Lemma 2 is as follows (we omit the i subscript to ease
the notational burden). Consider an arbitrary  > 0 and an open set Θ(σ) ⊆ Θ
defined as the points which are within  distance of Θ(σ). The time t posterior over
the complement of Θ(σ), µt(Θ \Θ(σ)), can be expressed as
´
Θ\Θ(σ)
∏t−1
τ=0Qθ(yτ | sτ , xτ )µ0(dθ)´
Θ
∏t−1
τ=0 Qθ(yτ | sτ , xτ )µ0(dθ)
=
´
Θ\Θ(σ) e
tKt(θ)µ0(dθ)´
Θ
etKt(θ)µ0(dθ)
36For example, if player 1 believes that player 2 plays A with probability θ and B with 1− θ, then
the wKLD function is infinity at θ = 1 if player 2 plays B with positive probability.
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where Kt(θ) equals minus the log-likelihood ratio, −1t
∑t−1
τ=0 ln
Qστ (yτ |sτ ,xτ )
Qθ(yτ |sτ ,xτ ) . This ex-
pression and straightforward algebra implies that
µt(Θ \Θ(σ)) ≤
´
Θ\Θ(σ) e
t(Kt(θ)+K(σ,θ0)+δ)µ0(dθ)´
Θη(σ)
et(Kt(θ)+K(σ,θ0)+δ)µ0(dθ)
for any δ > 0 and θ0 ∈ Θ(σ) and η > 0 taken to be “small”. Roughy speaking, the
integral in the numerator in the RHS is taken over points which are “-separated”
from Θ(σ), whereas the integral in the denominator is taken over points which are
“η-close” to Θ(σ).
Intuitively, if Kt(·) behaves asymptotically like −K(σ, ·), there exist sufficiently
small δ > 0 and η > 0 such that Kt(θ) + K(σ, θ0) + δ is negative for all θ which are
“-separated” from Θ(σ), and positive for all θ which are “η-close” to Θ(σ). Thus, the
numerator converges to zero, whereas the denominator diverges to infinity, provided
that Θη(σ) has positive measure under the prior.
The nonstandard part of the proof consists of establishing that Θη(σ) has positive
measure under the prior, which relies on Assumption 1, and that indeed Kt(·) behaves
asymptotically like −K(σ, ·). By virtue of Fatou’s lemma, for θ ∈ Θη(σ) it suffices to
show almost sure pointwise convergence of Kt(θ) to −K(σ, θ); this is done in Claim
B(i) in the Appendix and relies on a LLN argument for non-iid variables. On the
other hand, over θ ∈ Θ \ Θ(σ), we need to control the asymptotic behavior of Kt(.)
uniformly to be able to interchange the limit and integral. In Claims B(ii) and B(iii)
in the Appendix, we establish that there exists α > 0 such that asymptotically and
over Θ \Θ(σ), Kt(·) < −K(σ, θ0)− α.
While Lemma 2 implies that the support of posteriors converges, posteriors need
not converge. We can always find, however, a subsequence of posteriors that converges.
By continuity of behavior in beliefs and the assumption that players are myopic, the
stable strategy profile must be statically optimal. Thus, we obtain the following char-
acterization of the set of stable strategy profiles when players follow optimal policies.
Theorem 2. Suppose that a strategy profile σ is stable under an optimal policy profile
for a perturbed game. Then σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of the perturbed game.
Proof. Let φ denote the optimal policy function under which σ is stable. By Lemma
2, there exists H ⊆ H with Pµ0,φ (H) > 0 such that, for all h ∈ H, limt→∞ σt(h) = σ
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and limt→∞ µit (U
i) = 1 for all i ∈ I and all open sets U i ⊇ Θi(σ); for the remainder of
the proof, fix any h ∈ H. For all i ∈ I, compactness of ∆(Θi) implies the existence of
a subsequence, which we denote as (µit(j))j, such that µ
i
t(j) converges (weakly) to µ
i
∞
(the limit could depend on h). We conclude by showing, for all i ∈ I:
(i) µi∞ ∈ ∆(Θi(σ)): Suppose not, so that there exists θˆi ∈ supp(µi∞) such that
θˆi /∈ Θi(σ). Then, since Θi(σ) is closed (by Lemma 1), there exists an open set
U i ⊃ Θi(σ) with closure U¯ i such that θˆi /∈ U¯ i. Then µi∞(U¯ i) < 1, but this contradicts
the fact that µi∞
(
U¯ i
) ≥ lim supj→∞ µit(j) (U¯ i) ≥ limj→∞ µit(j) (U i) = 1, where the first
inequality holds because U¯ i is closed and µit(j) converges (weakly) to µ
i
∞.
(ii) σi is optimal for the perturbed game given µi∞ ∈ ∆(Θi):
σi(xi | si) = lim
j→∞
σit(j)(h)(x
i|si) = lim
j→∞
Pξ
(
ξi : xi ∈ Ψi(µit(j), si, ξi)
)
= Pξ
(
ξi : xi ∈ Ψi(µi∞, si, ξi)
)
,
where the second equality follows because φi is optimal and Ψi is single-valued, a.s.-
Pξi ,
37 and the third equality follows from a standard continuity argument.
4.3 A converse result
Theorem 2 provides our main justification for Berk-Nash equilibria: any strategy
profile that is not an equilibrium cannot represent limiting behavior of optimizing
players. Theorem 2, however, does not imply that behavior stabilizes. It is well
known that convergence is not guaranteed for Nash equilibrium, which is a special
case of Berk-Nash equilibrium.38 Thus, some assumption needs to be relaxed to prove
convergence for general games. Fudenberg and Kreps (1993) show that a converse
for the case of Nash equilibrium can be obtained by relaxing optimality and allowing
players to make vanishing optimization mistakes.
Definition 8. A policy profile φ is asymptotically optimal if there exists a positive
real-valued sequence (εt)t with limt→∞ εt = 0 such that, for all i ∈ I, all (µi, si, ξi) ∈
37Ψi is single-valued a.s.-Pξi because the set of ξ
i such that #Ψi(µi, si, ξi) > 1 is of dimension
lower than #Xi and, by absolute continuity of Pξi , this set has measure zero.
38Jordan (1993) shows that non-convergence is robust to the choice of initial conditions; Benaim
and Hirsch (1999) replicate this finding for the perturbed version of Jordan’s game. In the game-
theory literature, general global convergence results have only been obtained in special classes of
games—e.g. zero-sum, potential, and supermodular games (Hofbauer and Sandholm, 2002).
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∆(Θi)× Si × Ξi, all t, and all xi ∈ Xi,
EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,xit)
[
pii(xit, Y
i)
]
+ ξi(xit) ≥ EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,xi)
[
pii(xi, Y i)
]
+ ξi(xi)− εt
where xit = φ
i
t(µ
i, si, ξi).
Fudenberg and Kreps’ (1993) insight is to suppose that players are convinced
early on that the equilibrium strategy is the right one to play, and continue to play
this strategy unless they have strong enough evidence to think otherwise. And, as
they continue to play the equilibrium strategy, the evidence increasingly convinces
them that it is the right thing to do. This idea, however, need not work for Berk-
Nash equilibrium because beliefs may not converge if the model is misspecified (see
Berk (1966) for an example). If the game is weakly identified, however, Lemma 2 and
Fudenberg and Kreps’ (1993) insight can be combined to obtain the following converse
of Theorem 2.
Theorem 3. Suppose that σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of a perturbed game that is
weakly identified given σ. Then there exists a profile of priors with full support and
an asymptotically optimal policy profile φ such that σ is strongly stable under φ.
Proof. See Online Appendix B.39
5 Discussion
importance of assumption 1. The following example illustrates that equilib-
rium may not exist and Lemma 2 fails if Assumption 1 does not hold. A single agent
chooses action x ∈ {A,B} and obtains outcome y ∈ {0, 1}. The agent’s model is
parameterized by θ = (θA, θB), where Qθ(y = 1 | A) = θA and Qθ(y = 1 | B) = θB.
The true model is θ0 = (1/4, 3/4). The agent, however, is misspecified and considers
only θ1 = (0, 3/4) and θ2 = (1/4, 1/4) to be possible, i.e., Θ = {θ1, θ2}. In particular,
Assumption 1(iii) fails for parameter value θ1.
40 Suppose that A is uniquely optimal
for parameter value θ1 and B is uniquely optimal for θ2 (further details about payoffs
are not needed).
39The requirement that the priors have full support makes the statement non trivial.
40Assumption 1(iii) would hold if, for some ε¯ > 0, θ = (ε, 3/4) were also in Θ for all 0 < ε ≤ ε¯.
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A Berk-Nash equilibrium does not exist: If A is played with positive probability,
then the wKLD is infinity at θ1 (i.e., θ1 cannot rationalize y = 1 given A) and θ2 is
the best fit; but then A is not optimal. If B is played with probability 1, then θ1 is
the best fit; but then B is not optimal. In addition, Lemma 2 fails: Suppose that
the path of play converges to pure strategy B. The best fit given B is θ1, but the
posterior need not converge weakly to a degenerate probability distribution on θ1; it
is possible that, along the path of play, the agent tried action A and observed y = 1,
in which case the posterior would immediately assign probability 1 to θ2.
forward-looking agents. In the dynamic model, we assumed that players
are myopic. In Online Appendix C, we extend Theorem 2 to the case of non-myopic
players who solve a dynamic optimization problem with beliefs as a state variable.
A key fact used in the proof of Theorem 2 is that myopically optimal behavior is
continuous in beliefs. Non-myopic optimal behavior is also continuous in beliefs, but
the issue is that it may not coincide with myopic behavior in the steady state if players
still have incentives to experiment. We prove the extension by requiring that the game
is weakly identified, which guarantees that players have no incentives to experiment
in steady state.
large population models. The framework assumes that there is a fixed num-
ber of players but, by focusing on stationary subjective models, rules out aspects of
“repeated games” where players attempt to influence each others’ play. In Online Ap-
pendix D, we adapt the equilibrium concept to settings in which there is a population
of a large number of agents in the role of each player, so that agents have negligible
incentives to influence each other’s play.
extensive-form games. Our results hold for an alternative timing where player
i commits to a signal-contingent plan of action (i.e., a strategy) and observes both the
realized signal si and the consequence yi ex post. In particular, Berk-Nash equilib-
rium is applicable to extensive-form games provided that players compete by choosing
contingent plan of actions and know the extensive form. But the right approach is
less clear if players have a misspecified view of the extensive form (for example, they
may not even know the set of strategies available to them) or if players play the
game sequentially (for example, we would need to define and update beliefs at each
information set). The extension to extensive-form games is left for future work.41
41Jehiel (1995) considers the class of repeated alternating-move games and assumes that players
only forecast a limited number of time periods into the future; see Jehiel (1998) for a learning
foundation. Jehiel and Samet (2007) consider the general class of extensive form games with perfect
27
relationship to bounded rationality literature. By providing a language
that makes the underlying misspecification explicit, we offer some guidance for choos-
ing between different models of bounded rationality. For example, we could model
the observed behavior of an instructor in Example 2.3 by directly assuming that she
believes criticism improves performance and praise worsens it.42 But extrapolating
this observed belief to other contexts may lead to erroneous conclusions. Instead,
we postulate what we think is a plausible misspecification (i.e., failure to account for
regression to the mean) and then derive beliefs endogenously, as a function of the
context.
We mentioned in the paper several instances of bounded rationality that can be
formalized via misspecified, endogenous learning. Other examples in the literature
can also be viewed as restricting beliefs using the wKLD measure, but fall outside the
scope of our paper either because interactions are mediated by a price or because the
problem is dynamic (we focus on the repetition of a static problem). For example,
Blume and Easley (1982) and Rabin and Vayanos (2010) explicitly characterize beliefs
using the limit of a likelihood function, while Bray (1982), Radner (1982), Sargent
(1993), and Evans and Honkapohja (2001) focus specifically on OLS learning with
misspecified models. Piccione and Rubinstein (2003), Eyster and Piccione (2013),
and Spiegler (2013) study pattern recognition in dynamic settings and impose con-
sistency requirements on beliefs that could be interpreted as minimizing the wKLD
measure. In the sampling equilibrium of Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) and Spiegler
(2006), beliefs may be incorrect due to learning from a limited sample, rather than
from misspecified learning. Other instances of bounded rationality that do not seem
naturally fitted to misspecified learning, include biases in information processing due
to computational complexity (e.g., Rubinstein (1986), Salant (2011)), bounded mem-
ory (e.g., Wilson, 2003), self-deception (e.g., Be´nabou and Tirole (2002), Compte and
Postlewaite (2004)), or sparsity-based optimization (Gabaix (2014)).
information and assume that players simplify the game by partitioning the nodes into similarity
classes. In both cases, players are required to have correct beliefs, given their limited or simplified
view of the game.
42This assumption corresponds to a singleton set Θ, thus fixing beliefs at the outset and leaving
no space for learning. This approach is common in past work that assumes that agents have a
misspecified model but there is no learning about parameter values, e.g., Barberis et al. (1998).
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Appendix
Let Zi =
{
(si, xi, yi) ∈ Si × Xi × Yi : yi = f i(xi, x−i, ω), x−i ∈ X−i, ω ∈ supp(pΩ|Si(· | si))
}
.
For all zi = (si, xi, yi) ∈ Zi, define P¯ iσ(zi) = Qiσ(yi | si, xi)σi(xi | si)pSi(si). We some-
times abuse notation and write Qiσ(z
i) ≡ Qiσ(yi | si, xi), and similarly for Qiθi . The
following claim is used in the proofs below.
Claim A. For all i ∈ I: (i) There exists θi∗ ∈ Θi and K¯ <∞ such that, ∀σ ∈ Σ,
Ki(σ, θi∗) ≤ K¯; (ii) Fix any θi ∈ Θi and (σn)n such that Qiθi(zi) > 0 ∀zi ∈ Zi
and limn→∞ σn = σ. Then limn→∞Ki(σn, θi) = Ki(σ, θi); (iii) Ki is (jointly) lower
semicontinuous: Fix any (θin)n and (σn)n such that limn→∞ θ
i
n = θ
i, limn→∞ σn = σ.
Then lim infn→∞Ki(σn, θin) ≥ K(σ, θi); (iv) Let ξi be a random vector in R#Xi with
absolutely continuous probability distribution Pξ. Then, ∀(si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi, µi 7→
σi(µi)(xi | si) = Pξ
(
ξi : xi ∈ arg maxx¯i∈Xi EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,x¯i) [pi
i(x¯i, Y i)]+ξi(x¯i)
)
is continuous.
Proof. (i) By Assumption 1 and finiteness of Zi, there exist θi∗ ∈ Θ and α ∈ (0, 1)
such that Qiθi∗(z
i) ≥ α ∀zi ∈ Zi. Thus, ∀σ ∈ Σ, K(σ, θ∗) ≤ −EP¯ iσ [lnQiθ∗(Zi)] ≤ − lnα.
(ii)Ki(σn, θ
i)−K(σ, θi) = ∑zi∈Zi{(P¯ iσn(zi) lnQiσn(zi)−P¯ iσ(zi) lnQiσ(zi))+(P¯ iσ(zi)−
P¯ iσn(z
i)
)
lnQiθi(z
i)
}
. The first term in the RHS converges to 0 because limn→∞ σn = σ,
Qσ is continuous, and x lnx is continuous ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. The second term converges to 0
because limn→∞ σn = σ, P¯ iσ is continuous, and lnQ
i
θi(z
i) ∈ (−∞, 0] ∀zi ∈ Zi.
(iii)Ki(σn, θ
i
n)−K(σ, θi) =
∑
zi∈Zi
{(
P¯ iσn(z
i) lnQiσn(z
i)−P¯ iσ(zi) lnQiσ(zi)
)
+
(
P¯ iσ(z
i) lnQiθi(z
i)−
P¯ iσn(z
i) lnQiθin(z
i)
)}
. The first term in the RHS converges to 0 (same argument as in
part (ii)). The proof concludes by showing that, ∀zi ∈ Zi,
lim inf
n→∞
−P¯ iσn(zi) lnQiθin(zi) ≥ −P¯ iσ(zi) lnQiθi(zi). (8)
Suppose lim infn→∞−P¯ iσn(zi) lnQiθin(zi) ≤ M < ∞ (if not, (8) holds trivially). Then
either (i) P¯ iσn(z
i) → P¯ iσ(zi) > 0, in which case (8) holds with equality (by continuity
of θi 7→ Qiθi), or (ii) P¯ iσn(zi)→ P¯ iσ(zi) = 0, in which case (8) holds because its RHS is
0 (by convention that 0 ln 0 = 0) and its LHS is always nonnegative.
(iv) The proof is standard and, therefore, omitted. 
Proof of Lemma 1. Part (i). Note that
Ki(σ, θi) ≥ −
∑
(si,xi)∈Si×Xi
ln
(
EQiσ(·|si,xi)
[Qiθi(Y i | si, xi)
Qiσ(Y
i | si, xi)
])
σi(xi | si)pSi(si) = 0,
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where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality and the strict concavity of ln(·),
and it holds with equality if and only if Qiθi(· | si, xi) = Qiθi(· | si, xi) ∀(si, xi) such
that σi(xi | si) > 0 (recall that, by assumption, pSi(si) > 0).
Part (ii). Θi(σ) is nonempty : By Claim A(i), ∃K < ∞ such that the minimizers
are in the constraint set {θi ∈ Θi : Ki(σ, θi) ≤ K}. Because Ki(σ, ·) is continuous
over a compact set, a minimum exists.
Θi(σ) is upper hemicontinuous (uhc): Fix any (σn)n and (θ
i
n)n such that limn→∞ σn =
σ, limn→∞ θin = θ
i, and θin ∈ Θi(σn) ∀n. We show that θi ∈ Θi(σ) (so that Θi(·)
has a closed graph and, by compactness of Θi, is uhc). Suppose, to obtain a con-
tradiction, that θi /∈ Θi(σ). By Claim A(i), there exist θˆi ∈ Θi and ε > 0 such
that Ki(σ, θˆi) ≤ Ki(σ, θi) − 3ε and Ki(σ, θˆi) < ∞. By Assumption 1, ∃(θˆij)j with
limj→∞ θˆij = θˆ
i and, ∀j, Qi
θˆij
(zi) > 0 ∀zi ∈ Zi. We show that there is an element of the
sequence, θˆiJ , that “does better” than θ
i
n given σn, which is a contradiction. Because
Ki(σ, θˆi) <∞, continuity of Ki(σ, ·) implies that there exists J large enough such that∣∣∣Ki(σ, θˆiJ)−Ki(σ, θˆi)∣∣∣ ≤ ε/2. Moreover, Claim A(ii) applied to θi = θˆiJ implies that
there exists Nε,J such that, ∀n ≥ Nε,J ,
∣∣∣Ki(σn, θˆiJ)−Ki(σ, θˆiJ)∣∣∣ ≤ ε/2. Thus, ∀n ≥
Nε,J ,
∣∣Ki(σn, θˆiJ)−Ki(σ, θˆi)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Ki(σn, θˆiJ)−Ki(σ, θˆiJ)∣∣+ ∣∣Ki(σ, θˆiJ)−Ki(σ, θˆi)∣∣ ≤ ε.
Therefore,
Ki(σn, θˆ
i
J) ≤ Ki(σ, θˆi) + ε ≤ Ki(σ, θi)− 2ε. (9)
Suppose Ki(σ, θi) < ∞. By Claim A(iii), ∃nε ≥ Nε,J such that Ki(σnε , θinε) ≥
Ki(σ, θi) − ε. This result and expression (9), imply Ki(σnε , θˆiJ) ≤ K(σnε , θinε) − ε.
But this contradicts θinε ∈ Θi(σnε). Finally, if Ki(σ, θi) = ∞, Claim A(iii) implies
that ∃nε ≥ Nε,J such that Ki(σnε , θinε) ≥ 2K, where K is the bound defined in Claim
A(i). But this also contradicts θinε ∈ Θi(σnε).
Θi(σ) is compact : As shown above, Θi(·) has a closed graph, and so Θi(σ) is a
closed set. Compactness of Θi(σ) follows from compactness of Θi. 
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the result in two parts. Part 1. We show
existence of equilibrium in the perturbed game (defined in Section 4.1). Let Γ :
×i∈I∆(Θi) ⇒ ×i∈I∆(Θi) be a correspondence such that, ∀µ = (µi)i∈I ∈ ×i∈I∆(Θi),
Γ(µ) = ×i∈I∆ (Θi(σ(µ))) , where σ(µ) = (σi(µi))i∈I ∈ Σ and is defined as
σi(µi)(xi|si) = Pξ
(
ξi : xi ∈ arg max
x¯i∈Xi
EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,x¯i)
[
pii(x¯i, Y i)
]
+ ξi(x¯i)
)
(10)
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∀(xi, si) ∈ Xi × Si. Note that if ∃µ∗ ∈ ×i∈I∆(Θi) such that µ∗ ∈ Γ(µ∗), then σ∗ ≡
(σi(µi∗))i∈I is an equilibrium of the perturbed game. We show that such µ∗ exists
by checking the conditions of the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point theorem: (i)
×i∈I∆(Θi) is compact, convex and locally convex Hausdorff: The set ∆(Θi) is convex,
and since Θi is compact ∆(Θi) is also compact under the weak topology (Aliprantis
and Border (2006), Theorem 15.11). By Tychonoff’s theorem, ×i∈I∆(Θi) is compact
too. Finally, the set is also locally convex under the weak topology;43 (ii) Γ has
convex, nonempty images: It is clear that ∆ (Θi(σ(µ))) is convex valued ∀µ. Also,
by Lemma 1, Θi(σ(µ)) is nonempty ∀µ; (iii) Γ has a closed graph: Let (µn, µˆn)n be
such that µˆn ∈ Γ(µn) and µn → µ and µˆn → µˆ (under the weak topology). By Claim
A(iv), µi 7→ σi(µi) is continuous. Thus, σn ≡ (σi(µin))i∈I → σ ≡ (σi(µi))i∈I . By
Lemma 1, σ 7→ Θi(σ) is uhc; thus, by Theorem 17.13 in Aliprantis and Border (2006),
σ 7→ ×i∈I∆ (Θi(σ)) is also uhc. Therefore, µˆ ∈ ×i∈I∆ (Θi(σ)) = Γ(µ).
Part 2. Fix a sequence of perturbed games indexed by the probability of per-
turbations (Pξ,n)n. By Part 1, there is a corresponding sequence of fixed points
(µn)n, such that µn ∈ ×i∈I∆ (Θi(σn)) ∀n, where σn ≡ (σi(µin, Pξ,n))i∈I (see equa-
tion (10), where we now explicitly account for dependance on Pξ,n). By compactness,
there exist subsequences of (µn)n and (σn)n that converge to µ and σ, respectively.
Since σ 7→ ×i∈I∆ (Θi(σ)) is uhc, then µ ∈ ×i∈I∆ (Θi(σ)). We now show that if
we choose (Pξ,n)n such that, ∀ε > 0, limn→∞ Pξ,n (‖ξin‖ ≥ ε) = 0, then σ is opti-
mal given µ in the unperturbed game—this establishes existence of equilibrium in
the unperturbed game. Suppose not, so that there exist i, si, xi, xˆi, and ε > 0 such
that σi(xi | si) > 0 and EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,xi) [pi
i(xi, Y i)] + 4ε ≤ EQ¯i
µi
(·|si,xˆi) [pi
i(xˆi, Y i)]. By con-
tinuity of µi 7→ Q¯iµi and the fact that limn→∞ µin = µi, ∃n1 such that, ∀n ≥ n1,
EQ¯i
µin
(·|si,xi) [pi
i(xi, Y i)] + 2ε ≤ EQ¯i
µin
(·|si,xˆi) [pi
i(xˆi, Y i)]. It then follows from (10) and
limn→∞ Pξ,n (‖ξin‖ ≥ ε) = 0 that limn→∞ σi(µin, Pξ,n)(xi|si) = 0. But this contradicts
limn→∞ σi(µin, Pξ,n)(x
i|si) = σi(xi | si) > 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. In the next paragraph, we prove the following result:
For all σ and θ¯iσ ∈ Θi(σ), (a) QiΩ,θ¯iσ(ω
′ | si) = pΩ|Si(ω′ | si) for all si ∈ S i, ω′ ∈ Ω
and (b) QiX−i,θ¯iσ
(x−i | αi) = ∑ω′′∈Ω pΩ|Ai(ω′′ | αi)∏j 6=i σj(xj | sj(ω′′)) for all αi ∈
Ai, x−i ∈ X−i. Equivalence between Berk-Nash and ABEE follows immediately from
(a), (b), and the fact that expected utility of player i with signal si and beliefs θ¯σ
43This last claim follows since the weak topology is induced by a family of semi-norms of the form:
ρ(µ, µ′) = |Eµ[f ]− Eµ′ [f ]| for f continuous and bounded for any µ and µ′ in ∆(Θi).
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equals
∑
ω′∈ΩQ
i
Ω,θ¯iσ
(ω′ | si)∑x−i∈X−i QiX−i,θ¯iσ(x−i | αi(ω′))pii(x¯i, x−i, ω′).
Proof of (a) and (b): −Ki(σ, θi) equals, up to a constant,∑
si,w˜,x˜−i
ln
(
QiΩ,θi(ω˜ | si)QiX−i,θi(x˜−i | αi(ω˜))
)∏
j 6=i
σj(x˜j | sj(ω˜))pΩ|Si(ω˜ | si)pSi(si)
=
∑
si,ω˜
ln
(
QiΩ,θi(ω˜ | si)
)
pΩ|Si(ω˜ | si)pSi(si) +
∑
x˜−i,αi∈Ai
ln
(
QiX−i,θi(x˜
−i | αi))∑
ω˜∈αi
∏
j 6=i
σj(x˜j | sj(ω˜))pΩ(ω˜).
It is straightforward to check that any parameter value that maximizes the above
expression satisfies (a) and (b). 
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof uses Claim B, which is stated and proven after
this proof. It is sufficient to establish that limt→∞
´
Θi
di(σ, θi)µit(dθ
i) = 0 a.s. in H,
where di(σ, θi) = inf θˆi∈Θi(σ) ‖θi − θˆi‖. Fix i ∈ I and h ∈ H. Then, by Bayes’ rule,
ˆ
Θi
di(σ, θi)µit(dθ
i) =
´
Θi
di(σ, θi)
∏t−1
τ=0
Qi
θi
(yiτ |siτ ,xiτ )
Qiστ (y
i
τ |siτ ,xiτ )µ
i
0(dθ
i)
´
Θi
∏t−1
τ=0
Qi
θi
(yiτ |siτ ,xiτ )
Qiστ (y
i
τ |siτ ,xiτ )µ
i
0(dθ
i)
=
´
Θi
di(σ, θi)etK
i
t(h,θ
i)µi0(dθ
i)´
Θi
etK
i
t(h,θ
i)µi0(dθ
i)
,
where the first equality is well-defined by Assumption 1, full support of µi0, and the
fact that Pµ0,φ (H) > 0 implies that all the Qiστ terms are positive, and where we define
Kit(h, θ
i) = −1
t
∑t−1
τ=0 ln
Qiστ (y
i
τ |siτ ,xiτ )
Qi
θi
(yiτ |siτ ,xiτ ) for the second equality.
44 For any α > 0, define
Θiα(σ) ≡ {θi ∈ Θi : di(σ, θi) < α}. Then, for all ε > 0 and η > 0,
´
Θi
di(σ, θi)µit(dθ
i) ≤
ε+C
Ait(h,σ,ε)
Bit(h,σ,η)
, where C ≡ supθi1,θi2∈Θi ‖θi1 − θi2‖ <∞ (because Θi is bounded) and where
Ait(h, σ, ε) =
´
Θi\Θiε(σ) e
tKit(h,θ
i)µi0(dθ
i) and Bit(h, σ, η) =
´
Θiη(σ)
etK
i
t(h,θ
i)µi0(dθ
i).The
proof concludes by showing that, for all (sufficiently small) ε > 0, ∃ηε > 0 such
that limt→∞Ait(h, σ, ε)/B
i
t(h, σ, ηε) = 0. This result is achieved in several steps. First,
∀ε > 0, define Kiε(σ) = inf {Ki(σ, θi) | θi ∈ Θi\Θiε(σ)} and αε = (Kiε(σ)−Ki0(σ)) /3,
where Ki0(σ) = infθi∈Θi K
i(σ, θi). By continuity of Ki(σ, ·), there exist ε¯ and α¯ such
that, ∀ε ≤ ε¯, 0 < αε ≤ α¯ <∞. Henceforth, let ε ≤ ε¯. It follows that
Ki(σ, θi) ≥ Kiε(σ) > Ki0(σ) + 2αε (11)
∀θi such that di(σ, θi) ≥ ε. Also, by continuity of Ki(σ, ·), ∃ηε > 0 such that, ∀θi ∈
44If, for some θi, Qiθi(y
i
τ | siτ , xiτ ) = 0 for some τ ∈ {0, ..., t − 1}, then we define Kit(h, θi) = −∞
and exp
{
tKit(h, θ
i)
}
= 0.
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Θiηε ,
Ki(σ, θi) < Ki0(σ) + αε/2. (12)
Second, let Θˆi =
{
θi ∈ Θi : Qiθi(yiτ | siτ , xiτ ) > 0 for all τ
}
and Θˆiηε(σ) = Θˆ
i ∩
Θiηε(σ). We now show that µ
i
0(Θˆ
i
ηε(σ)) > 0. By Lemma 1, Θ
i(σ) is nonempty. Pick
any θi ∈ Θi(σ). By Assumption 1, ∃(θin)n in Θi such that limn→∞ θin = θi and
Qiθin(y
i | si, xi) > 0 ∀yi ∈ f i(Ω, xi,X−i) and all (si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi. In particular, ∃θin¯
such that di(σ, θin¯) < .5ηε and, by continuity of Q·, there exists an open set U around
θin¯ such that U ⊆ Θˆiηε(σ). By full support, µi0(Θˆiηε(σ)) > 0. Next, note that,
lim inf
t→∞
Bit(h, σ, ηε)e
t(Ki0(σ)+
αε
2
) ≥ lim inf
t→∞
ˆ
Θˆiηε (σ)
et(K
i
0(σ)+
αε
2
+Kit(h,θ
i))µi0(dθ
i)
≥
ˆ
Θˆiηε (σ)
elimt→∞ t(K
i
0(σ)+
αε
2
−Ki(σ,θi))µi0(dθ
i) =∞ (13)
a.s. in H, where the first inequality follows because Θˆiηε(σ) ⊆ Θiηε(σ) and exp is a
positive function, the second inequality follows from Fatou’s Lemma and a LLN for
non-iid random variables that implies limt→∞Kit(h, θ
i) = −Ki(σ, θi) ∀θi ∈ Θˆi, a.s. in
H (see Claim B(i) below), and the last equality follows from (12) and the fact that
µi0(Θ
i
ηε(σ)) > 0.
Next, we consider the term Ait(h, σ, ε). Claims B(ii) and B(iii) (see below) imply
that ∃T such that, ∀t ≥ T , Kit(h, θi) < −(Ki0(σ) + (3/2)αε) ∀θi ∈ Θi\Θiε(σ), a.s. in
H. Thus,
lim
t→∞
Ait(h, σ, ε)e
t(Ki0(σ)+αε) = lim
t→∞
ˆ
Θi\Θiε(σ)
et(K
i
0(σ)+αε+K
i
t(h,θ
i))µi0(dθ
i)
≤ µi0(Θi\Θiε(σ)) lim
t→∞
e−tαε/2 = 0.
a.s. inH. The above expression and equation (13) imply that limt→∞Ait(h, σ, ε)/Bit(h, σ, ηε) =
0 a.s.-Pµ0,φ. 
We state and prove Claim B used in the proof above. For any ξ > 0, define Θiσ,ξ to
be the set such that θi ∈ Θiσ,ξ if and only if Qiθi(yi | si, xi) ≥ ξ for all (si, xi, yi) such
that Qiσ(y
i | si, xi)σi(xi | si)pSi(si) > 0.
Claim B. For all i ∈ I: (i) For all θi ∈ Θˆi, limt→∞Kit(h, θi) = −Ki(σ, θi), a.s. in
H; (ii) There exist ξ∗ > 0 and Tξ∗ such that, ∀t ≥ Tξ∗, Kit(h, θi) < −(Ki0(σ)+(3/2)αε)
∀θi /∈ Θiσ,ξ, a.s. in H; (iii) For all ξ > 0, ∃Tˆξ such that, ∀t ≥ Tˆξ, Kit(h, θi) <
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−(Ki0(σ) + (3/2)αε) ∀θi ∈ Θiσ,ξ\Θiε(σ), a.s. in H.
Proof : Define freqit(z
i) = 1
t
∑t−1
τ=0 1zi(z
i
τ ) ∀zi ∈ Zi. Kit can be written asKit(h, θi) =
κi1t(h)+κ
i
2t(h)+κ
i
3t(h, θ
i), where κi1t(h) = −t−1
∑t−1
τ=0
∑
zi∈Zi
(
1zi(z
i
τ )− P¯ iστ (zi)
)
lnQiστ (z
i),
κi2t(h) = −t−1
∑t−1
τ=0
∑
zi∈Zi P¯
i
στ (z
i) lnQiστ (z
i), and κi3t(h, θ
i) =
∑
zi∈Zi freq
i
t(z
i) lnQiθi(z
i).
The statements made below hold almost surely in H, but we omit this qualification.
First, we show limt→∞ κi1t(h) = 0. Define l
i
τ (h, z
i) =
(
1zi(z
i
τ )− P¯ iστ (zi)
)
lnQiστ (z
i)
and Lit(h, z
i) =
∑t
τ=1 τ
−1liτ (h, z
i) ∀zi ∈ Zi. Fix any zi ∈ Zi. We show that Lit(·, zi)
converges a.s. to an integrable, and, therefore, finite function Li∞(·, zi). To show this,
we use martingale convergence results. Let ht denote the partial history until time
t. Since EPµ0,φ(·|ht)
[
lit+1(h, z
i)
]
= 0, then EPµ0,φ(·|ht)
[
Lit+1(h, z
i)
]
= Lit(h, z
i) and so
(Lit(h, z
i))t is a martingale with respect to P
µ0,φ. Next, we show that suptEPµ0,φ [|Lit(h, zi)|] ≤
M for M < ∞. Note that EPµ0,φ
[(
Lit(h, z
i)
)2]
= EPµ0,φ
[∑t
τ=1 τ
−2(liτ (h, zi))2 +
2
∑
τ ′>τ
1
τ ′τ l
i
τ (h, z
i)liτ ′(h, z
i)
]
. Since (lit)t is a martingale difference sequence, for τ
′ > τ ,
EPµ0,φ
[
liτ (h, z
i)liτ ′(h, z
i)
]
= 0. Therefore, EPµ0,φ
[(
Lit(h, z
i)
)2]
=
∑t
τ=1 τ
−2EPµ0,φ
[(
liτ (h, z
i)
)
2
]
.
Note also that EPµ0,φ(·|hτ−1)
[(
liτ (h, z
i)
)2] ≤ (lnQiστ (zi))2Qiστ (zi). Therefore, by the law
of iterated expectations, EPµ0,φ
[(
Lit(h, z
i)
)2] ≤∑tτ=1 τ−2EPµ0,φ[(lnQiστ (zi))2Qiστ (zi)],
which in turn is bounded above by 1 because (lnx)2x ≤ 1 ∀x ∈ [0, 1], where we use
the convention that (ln 0)20 = 0. Therefore, suptEPµ0,φ [|Lit|] ≤ 1. By Theorem
5.2.8 in Durrett (2010), Lit(h, z
i) converges a.s.-Pµ0,φ to a finite Li∞(h, z
i). Thus, by
Kronecker’s lemma (Pollard (2001), page 105)45, limt→∞
∑
zi∈Zi
{
t−1
∑t
τ=1
(
1zi(z
i
τ ) −
P¯ iστ (z
i)
)
lnQiστ (z
i)
}
= 0. Therefore, limt→∞ κi1t(h) = 0.
Next, consider κi2t(h). The assumption that limt→∞ σt = σ and continuity of
Qiσ lnQ
i
σ in σ imply that limt→∞ κ
i
2t(h) = −
∑
(si,xi)∈Si×Xi EQσ(·|si,xi) [lnQ
i
σ(Y
i | si, xi)]σi(xi |
si)pSi(s
i).
The limits of κi1t, κ
i
2t imply that, ∀γ > 0, ∃tˆγ such that, ∀t ≥ tˆγ,∣∣κi1t(h) +κi2t(h) + ∑
(si,xi)∈Si×Xi
EQσ(·|si,xi)
[
lnQiσ(Y
i | si, xi)]σi(xi | si)pSi(si)∣∣ ≤ γ. (14)
We now prove (i)-(iii) by characterizing the limit of κi3t(h, θ
i).
(i) For all zi ∈ Zi, ∣∣freqt(zi)− P¯ iσ(zi)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣t−1∑t−1τ=0(1zi(ziτ )−P¯ iστ (zi))∣∣+∣∣t−1∑t−1τ=0(P¯ iστ (zi)−
P¯ iσ(z
i)
)∣∣. The first term in the RHS goes to 0 (the proof is essentially identical to the
45This lemma implies that for a sequence (`t)t if
∑
τ `τ <∞, then
∑t
τ=1
bτ
bt
`τ → 0 where (bt)t is a
nondecreasing positive real valued that diverges to ∞. We can apply the lemma with `t ≡ t−1lt and
bt = t.
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proof above that κi1 goes to 0). The second term goes to 0 because limt→∞ σt = σ and
P¯ i· is continuous. Thus, ∀ζ > 0, ∃tˆζ such that, ∀t ≥ tˆζ , ∀zi ∈ Zi,∣∣freqit(zi)− P¯ iσ(zi)∣∣ < ζ (15)
Thus, since θi ∈ Θˆi, limt→∞ κi3t(h, θi) =
∑
(si,xi)∈Si×Xi EQσ(·|si,xi)
[
lnQiθi(Y
i | si, xi)]σi(xi |
si)pSi(s
i). This expression and (14) establish part (i).
(ii) For all θi /∈ Θiσ,ξ, let ziθi be such that P¯ iσ(ziθi) > 0 and Qiθi(ziθi) < ξ. By (15),
∃tpiL/2 such ∀t ≥ tpiL/2, κi3t(h, θi) ≤ freqit(ziθi) lnQiθi(ziθi) ≤ (piL/2) ln ξ ∀θi /∈ Θiσ,ξ,
where piL = minZi{P¯ iσ(zi) : P¯ iσ(zi) > 0}. This result and (14) imply that, ∀t ≥ t1 ≡
max{tpiL/2, tˆ1},
Kit(h, θ
i) ≤ −
∑
(si,xi)∈Si×Xi
EQσ(·|si,xi)
[
lnQiσ(Y
i | si, xi)]σi(xi | si)pSi(si) + 1 + (piL/2) ln ξ
≤ #Zi + 1 + (qiL/2) ln ξ, (16)
∀θi /∈ Θiσ,ξ, where the second line follows from the facts that σi(xi | si)pSi(si) ≤ 1 and
x ln(x) ∈ [−1, 0] ∀x ∈ [0, 1]. In addition, the fact that Ki0(σ) < ∞ and αε ≤ α¯ < ∞
∀ε ≤ ε¯ implies that the RHS of (16) can be made lower than −(Ki0(σ) + (3/2)αε) for
some sufficiently small ξ∗.
(iii) For any ξ > 0, let ζξ = −αε/(#Zi4 ln ξ) > 0. By (15), ∃tˆζξ such that, ∀t ≥ tˆζξ ,
κi3t(h, θ
i) ≤
∑
{zi:P¯ iσ(zi)>0}
freqit(z
i) lnQiθi(z
i) ≤
∑
{zi:P¯ iσ(zi)>0}
(
P¯ iσ(z
i)− ζξ
)
lnQiθi(z
i)
≤
∑
(si,xi)∈Si×Xi
EQσ(·|si,xi)
[
lnQiθi(Y
i | si, xi)]σi(xi | si)pSi(si)−#Ziζξ ln ξ,
∀θi ∈ Θiσ,ξ (since Qiθi(zi) ≥ ξ ∀zi such that P¯ iσ(zi) > 0). The above expression,
the fact that αε/4 = −#Ziζξ ln ξ, and (14) imply that, ∀t ≥ Tˆξ ≡ max{tˆζξ , tˆαε/4},
Kit(h, θ
i) < −Ki(σ, θi) + αε/2 ∀θi ∈ Θiσ,ξ. This result and (11) imply the desired
result. 
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Online Appendix
A Example: Trading with adverse selection
In this section, we provide the formal details for the trading environment in Example
2.5. Let p ∈ ∆(A × V) be the true distribution; we use subscripts, such as pA and
pV |A, to denote the corresponding marginal and conditional distributions. Let Y =
A×V∪{} denote the space of observable consequences, where  will be a convenient
way to represent the fact that there is no trade. We denote the random variable taking
values in V ∪ {} by Vˆ . Notice that the state space in this example is Ω = A× V.
Partial feedback is represented by the function fP : X × A × V → Y such that
fP (x, a, v) = (a, v) if a ≤ x and fP (x, a, v) = (a,) if a > x. Full feedback is
represented by fF (x, a, v) = (a, v). In all cases, payoffs are given by pi : X × Y →
R, where pi(x, a, v) = v − x if a ≤ x and 0 otherwise. The objective distribution
for the case of partial feedback, QP , is, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × V, QP (a, v | x) =
p(a, v)1{x≥a}(x), and, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, QP (a, | x) = pA(a)1{x<a}(x). The objective
distribution for the case of full feedback, QF , is, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × V, QF (a, v |
x) = p(a, v), and, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, QF (a, | x) = 0.
The buyer knows the environment except for the distribution p ∈ ∆(A×V). Then,
for any distribution in the subjective model, Qθ, the perceived expected profit from
choosing x ∈ X is
EQθ(·|x)[pi(x,A, Vˆ )] =
∑
(a,v)∈A×V
1{x≥a}(x) (v − x)Qθ(a, v | x). (17)
The buyer has either one of two misspecifications over p captured by the param-
eter sets ΘI = ∆(A) × ∆(V) (i.e., independent beliefs) or ΘA = ×j∆(A) × ∆(V)
(i.e., analogy-based beliefs) defined in the main text. Thus, combining feedback and
parameter sets, we have four cases to consider, and, for each case, we write down the
subjective model and wKLD function.
Cursed equilibrium . Feedback is fF and the parameter set is ΘI . The subjective
model is, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × V, QCθ (a, v | x) = θA(a)θV (v), and, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A,
QCθ (a, | x) = 0, where θ = (θA, θV ) ∈ ΘI .46 This is an analogy-based game. From
46In fact, the symbol  is not necessary for this example, but we keep it so that all feedback
functions are defined over the same space of consequences.
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(17), the perceived expected profit from x ∈ X is
PrθA (A ≤ x) (EθV [V ]− x) , (18)
where PrθA denotes probability with respect to θA and EθV denotes expectation with
respect to θV . Also, for all (pure) strategies x ∈ X, the wKLD function is47
KC(x, θ) = EQF (·|x)
[
ln
QF (A, Vˆ | x)
QCθ (A, Vˆ | x)
]
=
∑
(a,v)∈A×V
p(a, v) ln
p(a, v)
θA(a)θV (v)
.
For each x ∈ X, θ(x) = (θA(x), θV (x)) ∈ ΘI = ∆(A) ×∆(V), where θA(x) = pA and
θV (x) = pV is the unique parameter value that minimizes K
C(x, ·). Together with
(18), we obtain equation ΠCE in the main text.
Behavioral equilibrium (naive version). Feedback is fP and the parameter
set is ΘI . The subjective model is, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × V, QBEθ (a, v | x) =
θA(a)θV (v)1{x≥a}(x), and, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, QBEθ (a, | x) = θA(a)1{x<a}(x), where
θ = (θA, θV ) ∈ ΘI . From (17), perceived expected profit from x ∈ X is as in equation
(18). Also, for all (pure) strategies x ∈ X, the wKLD function is
KBE(x, θ) = EQP (·|x)
[
ln
QP (A, Vˆ | x)
QBEθ (A, Vˆ | x)
]
=
∑
{a∈A:a>x}
pA(a) ln
pA(a)
θA(a)
+
∑
{(a,v)∈A×V:a≤x}
p(a, v) ln
p(a, v)
θA(a)θV (v)
.
For each x ∈ X, θ(x) = (θA(x), θV (x)) ∈ ΘI = ∆(A) ×∆(V), where θA(x) = pA and
θV (x)(v) = pV |A(v | A ≤ x) ∀v ∈ V is the unique parameter value that minimizes
KBE(x, ·). Together with (18), we obtain equation ΠBE in the main text.
Analogy-based expectations equilibrium . Feedback is fF and the parameter
set is ΘA. The subjective model is, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × Vj, all j = 1, ..., k,
QABEEθ (a, v | x) = θj(a)θV (v), and, ∀x ∈ X, ∀a ∈ A, QABEEθ (a, | x) = 0, where
θ = (θ1, ..., θk, θV ) ∈ ΘA. This is an analogy-based game. From (17), perceived
expected profit from x ∈ X is
k∑
j=1
PrθV (V ∈ Vj)
{
Prθj(A ≤ x | V ∈ Vj) (EθV [V | V ∈ Vj]− x)
}
. (19)
47In all cases, the extension to mixed strategies is straightforward.
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Also, for all (pure) strategies x ∈ X, the wKLD function is
KABEE(x, θ) = EQF (·|x)
[
ln
QF (A, Vˆ | x)
QABEEθ (A, Vˆ | x)
]
=
k∑
j=1
∑
(a,v)∈A×Vj
p(a, v) ln
p(a, v)
θj(a)θV (v)
.
For each x ∈ X, θ(x) = (θ1(x), ..., θk(x), θV (x)) ∈ ΘA = ×j∆(A) × ∆(V), where
θj(x)(a) = pA|Vj(a | V ∈ Vj) ∀a ∈ A and θV (x) = pV is the unique parameter value
that minimizes KABEE(x, ·). Together with (19), we obtain equation ΠABEE in the
main text.
Behavioral equilibrium (naive version) with analogy classes . It is natu-
ral to also consider a case, unexplored in the literature, where feedback fP is partial
and the subjective model is parameterized by ΘA. Suppose that the buyer’s behav-
ior has stabilized to some price x∗. Due to the possible correlation across analogy
classes, the buyer might now believe that deviating to a different price x 6= x∗ af-
fects her valuation. In particular, the buyer might have multiple beliefs at x∗. To
obtain a natural equilibrium refinement, we assume that the buyer also observes
the analogy class that contains her realized valuation, whether she trades or not,
and that Pr(V ∈ Vj, A ≤ x) > 0 for all j = 1, ..., k and x ∈ X.48 We de-
note this new feedback assumption by a function fP
∗
: X × A × V → Y∗ where
Y∗ = A × V ∪ {1, ..., k} and fP ∗(x, a, v) = (a, v) if a ≤ x and fP ∗(x, a, v) = (a, j)
if a > x and v ∈ Vj. The objective distribution given this feedback function
is, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × V, QP ∗(a, v | x) = p(a, v)1{x≥a}(x), and, ∀x ∈ X,
∀a ∈ A and all j = 1, ..., k, QP ∗(a, j | x) = pA|Vj(a | V ∈ Vj)pV (Vj)1{x<a}(x).
The subjective model is, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × Vj and all j = 1, ..., k, QBEAθ (a, v |
x) = θj(a)θV (v)1{x≥a}(x), and, ∀x ∈ X, ∀(a, v) ∈ A × Vj and all j = 1, ..., k,
QBEAθ (a, j | x) = θj(a)
(∑
v∈Vj θV (v)
)
1{x<a}(x), where θ = (θ1, θ2, ..., θk, θV ) ∈ ΘA.
In particular, from (17), perceived expected profit from x ∈ X is as in equation (19).
48Alternatively, and more naturally, we could require the equilibrium to be the limit of a sequence
of mixed strategy equilibria with the property that all prices are chosen with positive probability.
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Also, for all (pure) strategies x ∈ X, the wKLD function is
KBEA(x, θ) =EQP∗ (·|x)
[
ln
QP
∗
(A, Vˆ | x)
QBEAθ (A, Vˆ | x)
]
=
k∑
j=1
∑
{(a,v)∈A×Vj :a≤x}
p(a, v) ln
p(a, v)
θj(a)θV (v)
+
∑
{(a,j)∈A×{1,...,k}:a>x}
pA|Vj(a | V ∈ Vj)pV (Vj) ln
pA|Vj(a | V ∈ Vj)pV (Vj)
θj(a)
∑
v∈Vj θV (v)
.
For each x ∈ X, θ(x) = (θ1(x), ..., θk(x), θV (x)) ∈ ΘA = ×j∆(A) × ∆(V), where
θj(x)(a) = pA|Vj(a | V ∈ Vj) ∀a ∈ A and θV (x)(v) = pV |A(v | V ∈ Vj, A ≤ x)pV (Vj)
∀v ∈ Vj, all j = 1, ..., k is the unique parameter value that minimizes KBEA(x, ·).
Together with (19), we obtain ΠBEA(x, x∗) =
∑k
i=j Pr(V ∈ Vj) Pr(A ≤ x | V ∈
Vj)
(
E
[
V | V ∈ Vj, A ≤ x∗
]− x).
B Proof of converse result: Theorem 3
Let (µ¯i)i∈I be a belief profile that supports σ as an equilibrium. Consider the following
policy profile φ = (φit)i,t: For all i ∈ I and all t,
(µi, si, ξi) 7→ φit(µi, si, ξi) ≡
ϕi(µ¯i, si, ξi) if maxi∈I ||Q¯iµi − Q¯iµ¯i || ≤ 12C εtϕi(µi, si, ξi) otherwise,
where ϕi is an arbitrary selection from Ψi, C ≡ maxI
{
#Yi × supXi×Yi |pii(xi, yi)|
}
<
∞, and the sequence (εt)t will be defined below. For all i ∈ I, fix any prior µi0 with
full support on Θi such that µi0(·|Θi(σ)) = µ¯i (where for any A ⊂ Θ Borel, µ(·|A) is
the conditional probability given A).
We now show that if εt ≥ 0 ∀t and limt→∞ εt = 0, then φ is asymptotically
optimal. Throughout this argument, we fix an arbitrary i ∈ I. Abusing notation, let
U i(µi, si, ξi, xi) = EQ¯µi (·|si,xi) [pi
i(xi, Y i)] + ξi(xi). It suffices to show that
U i(µi, si, ξi, φit(µ
i, si, ξi)) ≥ U i(µi, si, ξi, xi)− εt (20)
for all (i, t), all (µi, si, ξi), and all xi. By construction of φ, equation (20) is satisfied
if maxi∈I ||Q¯iµi − Q¯iµ¯i || > 12C εt. If, instead, maxi∈I ||Q¯iµi − Q¯iµ¯i || ≤ 12C εt, then
U i(µ¯i, si, ξi, φit(µ
i, si, ξi)) = U i(µ¯i, si, ξi, ϕi(µ¯i, si, ξi)) ≥ U i(µ¯i, si, ξi, xi), (21)
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∀xi ∈ Xi. Moreover, ∀xi,
∣∣U i(µ¯i, si, ξi, xi)− U i(µi, si, ξi, xi)∣∣ =∣∣∑
yi∈Yi
pi(xi, yi)
(
Q¯iµ¯i(y
i | si, xi)− Q¯iµi(yi | si, xi)
)∣∣
≤ sup
Xi×Yi
|pii(xi, yi)|
∑
yi∈Yi
∣∣(Q¯iµ¯i(yi | si, xi)− Q¯iµi(yi | si, xi))∣∣
≤ sup
Xi×Yi
|pii(xi, yi)| ×#Yi × max
yi,xi,si
∣∣Q¯iµ¯i(yi | si, xi)− Q¯iµi(yi | si, xi)∣∣
so by our choice of C, |U i(µ¯i, si, ξi, xi)− U i(µi, si, ξi, xi)| ≤ 0.5εt ∀xi. Therefore,
equation (21) implies equation (20); thus φ is asymptotically optimal if εt ≥ 0 ∀t and
limt→∞ εt = 0.
We now construct a sequence (εt)t such that εt ≥ 0 ∀t and limt→∞ εt = 0. Let
φ¯i = (φ¯it)t be such that φ¯
i
t(µ
i, ·, ·) = ϕi(µ¯i, ·, ·) ∀µi; i.e., φ¯i is a stationary policy that
maximizes utility under the assumption that the belief is always µ¯i. Let ζ i(µi) ≡
2C||Q¯iµi − Q¯iµ¯i || and suppose (the proof is at the end) that
P µ0,φ¯( lim
t→∞
max
i∈I
|ζ i(µit(h))| = 0) = 1 (22)
(recall that P µ0,φ¯ is the probability measure over H induced by the policy profile φ¯; by
definition of φ¯, P µ0,φ¯ does not depend on µ0). Then by the 2nd Borel-Cantelli lemma
(Billingsley (1995), pages 59-60), for any γ > 0,
∑
tP
µ0,φ¯ (maxi∈I |ζ i(µit(h))| ≥ γ) <
∞. Hence, for any a > 0, there exists a sequence (τ(j))j such that∑
t≥τ(j)
P µ0,φ¯
(
max
i∈I
|ζ i(µit(h))| ≥ 1/j
)
<
3
a
4−j (23)
and limj→∞ τ(j) =∞. For all t ≤ τ(1), we set εt = 3C, and, for any t > τ(1), we set
εt ≡ 1/N(t), where N(t) ≡
∑∞
j=1 1{τ(j) ≤ t}. Observe that, since limj→∞ τ(j) =∞,
N(t)→∞ as t→∞ and thus εt → 0.
Next, we show that Pµ0,φ (limt→∞ ‖σt(h∞)− σ‖ = 0) = 1, where (σt)t is the se-
quence of intended strategies given φ, i.e., σit(h)(x
i | si) = Pξ (ξi : φit(µit(h), si, ξi) = xi) .
Observe that, by definition, σi(xi | si) = Pξ
(
ξi : xi ∈ arg maxxˆi∈Xi EQ¯µ¯i (·|si,xˆi) [pii(xˆi, Y i)]+
ξi(xˆi)
)
. Since ϕi ∈ Ψi, it follows that we can write σi(xi | si) = Pξ (ξi : ϕi(µ¯i, si, ξi) = xi).
Let H ≡ {h : ‖σt(h)− σ‖ = 0, for all t}. It is sufficient to show that Pµ0,φ (H) = 1.
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To show this, observe that
Pµ0,φ (H) ≥Pµ0,φ
(
∩t{max
i
ζ i(µt) ≤ εt}
)
=
∞∏
t=τ(1)+1
Pµ0,φ
(
max
i
ζ i(µt) ≤ εt | ∩l<t {max
i
ζ i(µl) ≤ εl}
)
=
∞∏
t=τ(1)+1
Pµ0,φ¯
(
max
i
ζ i(µt) ≤ εt | ∩l<t {max
i
ζ i(µl) ≤ εl}
)
=Pµ0,φ¯
(
∩t>τ(1){max
i
ζ i(µt) ≤ εt}
)
,
where the second line omits the term Pµ0,φ (maxi ζ
i(µt) < εt for all t ≤ τ(1)) because
it is equal to 1 (since εt ≥ 3C ∀t ≤ τ(1)); the third line follows from the fact that
φit−1 = φ¯
i
t−1 if ζ
i(µt−1) ≤ εt−1, so the probability measure is equivalently given by
P µ0,φ¯; and where the last line also uses the fact that P µ0,φ¯ (maxi ζ
i(µt) < εt for all t ≤ τ(1)) =
1. In addition, ∀a > 0,
P µ0,φ¯
(
∩t>τ(1){max
i
ζ i(µt) ≤ εt}
)
=P µ0,φ¯
(
∩n∈{1,2,...} ∩{t>τ(1):N(t)=n} {max
i
ζ i(µt) ≤ n−1}
)
≥1−
∞∑
n=1
∑
{t:N(t)=n}
P µ0,φ¯
(
max
i
ζ i(µt) ≥ n−1
)
≥1−
∞∑
n=1
3
a
4−n = 1− 1
a
,
where the last line follows from (23). Thus, we have shown that Pµ0,φ (H) ≥ 1− 1/a
∀a > 0; hence, Pµ0,φ (H) = 1.
We conclude the proof by showing that equation (22) indeed holds. Observe that
σ is trivially stable under φ¯. By Lemma 2, ∀i ∈ I and all open sets U i ⊇ Θi(σ),
lim
t→∞
µit
(
U i
)
= 1 (24)
a.s. − P µ0,φ¯ (over H). Let H denote the set of histories such that xit(h) = xi and
sit(h) = s
i implies that σi(xi | si) > 0. By definition of φ¯, P µ0,φ¯(H) = 1. Thus, it
suffices to show that limt→∞maxi∈I |ζ i(µit(h))| = 0 a.s.-P µ0,φ¯ over H. To do this, take
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any A ⊆ Θ that is closed. By equation (24), ∀i ∈ I, and almost all h ∈ H,
lim sup
t→∞
ˆ
1A(θ)µ
i
t+1(dθ) = lim sup
t→∞
ˆ
1A∩Θi(σ)(θ)µ
i
t+1(dθ).
Moreover,
ˆ
1A∩Θi(σ)(θ)µ
i
t+1(dθ) ≤
ˆ
1A∩Θi(σ)(θ)
{ ∏t
τ=1Q
i
θ(y
i
τ | siτ , xiτ )µi0(dθ)´
Θi(σ)
∏t
τ=1Q
i
θ(y
i
τ | siτ , xiτ )µi0(dθ)
}
=µi0(A | Θi(σ)) = µ¯i(A),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that Θi(σ) ⊆ Θi; the first equality
follows from the fact that, since h ∈ H, the fact that the game is weakly identified
given σ implies that
∏t
τ=1 Q
i
θ(y
i
τ | siτ , xiτ ) is constant with respect to θ ∀θ ∈ Θi(σ), and
the last equality follows from our choice of µi0. Therefore, we established that a.s.-P
µ0,φ¯
over H, lim supt→∞ µit+1(h)(A) ≤ µ¯i(A) for A closed. By the portmanteau lemma, this
implies that, a.s. -P µ0,φ¯ over H, limt→∞
´
Θ
f(θ)µit+1(h)(dθ) =
´
Θ
f(θ)µ¯i(dθ) for any
f real-valued, bounded and continuous. Since, by assumption, θ 7→ Qiθ(yi | si, xi) is
bounded and continuous, the previous result applies to Qiθ(y
i | si, xi), and since y, s, x
take a finite number of values, this result implies that limt→∞ ||Q¯iµit(h) − Q¯
i
µ¯i || = 0
∀i ∈ I a.s. -P µ0,φ¯ over H. 
C Non-myopic players
In the main text, we proved the results for the case where players are myopic. Here,
we assume that players maximize discounted expected payoffs, where δi ∈ [0, 1) is the
discount factor of player i. In particular, players can be forward looking and decide to
experiment. Players believe, however, that they face a stationary environment and,
therefore, have no incentives to influence the future behavior of other players. We
assume for simplicity that players know the distribution of their own payoff perturba-
tions.
Because players believe that they face a stationary environment, they solve a (sub-
jective) dynamic optimization problem that can be cast recursively as follows. By the
Principle of Optimality, V i(µi, si) denotes the maximum expected discounted payoffs
(i.e., the value function) of player i who starts a period by observing signal si and by
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holding belief µi if and only if
V i(µi, si) =
ˆ
Ξi
{
max
xi∈Xi
EQ¯µi (·|si,xi)
[
pii(xi, Y i) + ξi(xi) + δEpSi
[
V i(µˆi, Si)
]]}
Pξ(dξ
i),
(25)
where µˆi = Bi(µi, si, xi, Y i) is the updated belief. For all (µi, si, ξi), let
Φi(µi, si, ξi) = arg max
xi∈Xi
EQ¯µi (·|si,xi)
[
pii(xi, Y i) + ξi(xi) + δEpSi
[
V i(µˆi, Si)
]]
.
The proof of the next lemma relies on standard arguments and is, therefore, omitted.49
Lemma 3. There exists a unique solution V i to the Bellman equation (25); this
solution is bounded in ∆(Θi) × Si and continuous as a function of µi. Moreover, Φi
is single-valued and continuous with respect to µi, a.s.- Pξ.
Because players believe they face a stationary environment with i.i.d. perturba-
tions, it is without loss of generality to restrict behavior to depend on the state of the
recursive problem. Optimality of a policy is defined as usual (with the requirement
that φit ∈ Φi ∀t).
Lemma 2 implies that the support of posteriors converges, but posteriors need not
converge. We can always find, however, a subsequence of posteriors that converges.
By continuity of dynamic behavior in beliefs, the stable strategy profile is dynamically
optimal (in the sense of solving the dynamic optimization problem) given this conver-
gent posterior. For weakly identified games, the convergent posterior is a fixed point
of the Bayesian operator. Thus, the players’ limiting strategies will provide no new in-
formation. Since the value of experimentation is nonnegative, it follows that the stable
strategy profile must also be myopically optimal (in the sense of solving the optimiza-
tion problem that ignores the future), which is the definition of optimality used in the
definition of Berk-Nash equilibrium. Thus, we obtain the following characterization
of the set of stable strategy profiles when players follow optimal policies.
Theorem 4. Suppose that a strategy profile σ is stable under an optimal policy profile
for a perturbed and weakly identified game. Then σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium of the
game.
49Doraszelski and Escobar (2010) study a similarly perturbed version of the Bellman equation.
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Proof. The first part of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 2. Here, we
prove that, given that limj→∞ σt(j) = σ and limj→∞ µit(j) = µ
i
∞ ∈ ∆(Θi(σ)) ∀i, then,
∀i, σi is optimal for the perturbed game given µi∞ ∈ ∆(Θi), i.e., ∀(si, xi),
σi(xi | si) = Pξ
(
ξi : ψi(µi∞, s
i, ξi) = {xi}) , (26)
where ψi(µi∞, s
i, ξi) ≡ arg maxxi∈Xi EQ¯i
µi∞
(·|si,xi) [pi
i(xi, Y i)] + ξi(xi).
To establish (26), fix i ∈ I and si ∈ Si. Then
lim
j→∞
σit(j)(h)(x
i|si) = lim
j→∞
Pξ
(
ξi : φit(j)(µ
i
t(j), s
i, ξi) = xi
)
= Pξ
(
ξi : Φi(µi∞, s
i, ξi) = {xi}) ,
where the second line follows by optimality of φi and Lemma 3. This implies that
σi(xi|si) = Pξ (ξi : Φi(µi∞, si, ξi) = {xi}). Thus, it remains to show that
Pξ
(
ξi : Φi(µi∞, s
i, ξi) = {xi}) = Pξ (ξi : ψi(µi∞, si, ξi) = {xi}) (27)
∀xi such that Pξ (ξi : Φi(µi∞, si, ξi) = {xi}) > 0. From now on, fix any such xi. Since
σi(xi | si) > 0, the assumption that the game is weakly identified implies that Qi
θi1
(· |
xi, si) = Qi
θi2
(· | xi, si) ∀θi1, θi2 ∈ Θ(σ). The fact that µi∞ ∈ ∆(Θi(σ)) then implies that
Bi(µi∞, s
i, xi, yi) = µi∞ (28)
∀yi ∈ Yi. Thus, Φi(µi∞, si, ξi) = {xi} is equivalent to
EQ¯
µi∞ (·|s
i,xi)
[
pii(xi, Y i) + ξi(xi) + δEpSi
[
V i(µi∞, S
i)
]]
> EQ¯
µi∞ (·|s
i,x˜i)
[
pii(x˜i, Y i) + ξi(x˜i) + δEpSi
[
V i(Bi(µi∞, s
i, x˜i, Y i), Si)
]]
≥ EQ¯
µi∞ (·|s
i,x˜i)
[
pii(x˜i, Y i) + ξi(x˜i)
]
+ δEpSi
[
V i(EQ¯
µi∞ (·|s
i,x˜i)
[
Bi(µi∞, s
i, x˜i, Y i)
]
, Si)
]
= EQ¯
µi∞ (·|s
i,x˜i)
[
pii(x˜i, Y i) + ξi(x˜i)
]
+ δEpSi
[
V i(µi∞, S
i)
]
∀x˜i ∈ Xi, where the first line follows by equation (28) and definition of Φi, the second
line follows by the convexity50 of V i as a function of µi and Jensen’s inequality, and
the last line by the fact that Bayesian beliefs have the martingale property. In turn,
50See, for example, Nyarko (1994), for a proof of convexity of the value function.
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the above expression is equivalent to ψ(µi∞, s
i, ξi) = {xi}.
D Population models
We discuss some variants of population models that differ in the matching technology
and feedback. The right variant of population model will depend on the specific
application.51
Single pair model. Each period a single pair of players is randomly selected
from each of the i populations to play the game. At the end of the period, the signals,
actions, and outcomes of their own population are revealed to everyone.52 Steady-
state behavior in this case corresponds exactly to the notion of Berk-Nash equilibrium
described in the paper.
Random matching model. Each period, all players are randomly matched and
observe only feedback from their own match. We now modify the definition of Berk-
Nash equilibrium to account for this random-matching setting. The idea is similar to
Fudenberg and Levine’s (1993) definition of a heterogeneous self-confirming equilib-
rium. Now each agent in population i can have different experiences and, hence, have
different beliefs and play different strategies in steady state.
For all i ∈ I, define
BRi(σ−i) =
{
σi : σi is optimal given µi ∈ ∆ (Θi(σi, σ−i))} .
Note that σ is a Berk-Nash equilibrium if and only if σi ∈ BRi(σ−i) ∀i ∈ I.
Definition 9. A strategy profile σ is a heterogeneous Berk-Nash equilibrium of
game G if, for all i ∈ I, σi is in the convex hull of BRi(σ−i).
Intuitively, a heterogenous equilibrium strategy σi is the result of convex combi-
nations of strategies that belong to BRi(σ−i); the idea is that each of these strategies
51In some cases, it may be unrealistic to assume that players are able to observe the private signals
of previous generations, so some of these models might be better suited to cases with public, but not
private, information.
52Alternatively, we can think of different incarnations of players born every period who are able to
observe the history of previous generations.
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is followed by a segment of the population i.53
Random-matching model with population feedback. Each period all play-
ers are randomly matched; at the end of the period, each player in population i ob-
serves the signals, actions, and outcomes of their own population. Define
B¯R
i
(σi, σ−i) =
{
σˆi : σˆi is optimal given µi ∈ ∆ (Θi(σi, σ−i))} .
Definition 10. A strategy profile σ is a heterogeneous Berk-Nash equilibrium
with population feedback of game G if, for all i ∈ I, σi is in the convex hull of
B¯R
i
(σi, σ−i).
The main difference when players receive population feedback is that their beliefs
no longer depend on their own strategies but rather on the aggregate population
strategies.
D.1 Equilibrium foundation
Using arguments similar to the ones in the text, it is now straightforward to conclude
that the definition of heterogenous Berk-Nash equilibrium captures the steady state
of a learning environment with a population of agents in the role of each player. To
see the idea, let each population i be composed of a continuum of agents in the unit
interval K ≡ [0, 1]. A strategy of agent ik (meaning agent k ∈ K from population i) is
denoted by σik. The aggregate strategy of population (i.e., player) i is σi =
´
K
σikdk.
Random matching model. Suppose that each agent is optimizing and that, for
all i, (σikt ) converges to σ
ik a.s. in K, so that individual behavior stabilizes.54 Then
Lemma 2 says that the support of beliefs must eventually be Θi(σik, σ−i) for agent
ik. Next, for each ik, take a convergent subsequence of beliefs µikt and denote it µ
ik
∞.
It follows that µik∞ ∈ ∆(Θi(σik, σ−i)) and, by continuity of behavior in beliefs, σik is
optimal given µik∞. In particular, σ
ik ∈ BRi(σ−i) for all ik and, since σi = ´
K
σikdk,
it follows that σi is in the convex hull of BRi(σ−i).
53Unlike the case of heterogeneous self-confirming equilibrium, a definition where each action in
the support of σ is supported by a (possibly different) belief would not be appropriate here. The
reason is that BRi(σ−i) might contain only mixed, but not pure strategies (e.g., Example 1).
54We need individual behavior to stabilize; it is not enough that it stabilizes in the aggregate. This
is natural, for example, if we believe that agents whose behavior is unstable will eventually realize
they have a misspecified model.
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Random matching model with population feedback. Suppose that each
agent is optimizing and that, for all i, σit =
´
K
σikt dk converges to σ
i. Then Lemma
2 says that the support of beliefs must eventually be Θi(σi, σ−i) for any agent in
population i. Next, for each ik, take a convergent subsequence of beliefs µikt and
denote it µik∞. It follows that µ
ik
∞ ∈ ∆(Θi(σi, σ−i)) and, by continuity of behavior in
beliefs, σik is optimal given µik∞. In particular, σ
ik ∈ ¯BRi(σ−i) for all i, k and, since
σi =
´
K
σikdk, it follows that σi is in the convex hull of ¯BRi(σ−i).
E Lack of payoff feedback
In the paper, players are assumed to observe their own payoffs. We now provide
two alternatives to relax this assumption. In the first alternative, players observe
no feedback about payoffs; in the second alternative, players may observe partial
feedback.
No payoff feedback. In the paper we had a single, deterministic payoff function
pii : Xi×Yi → R, which can be represented in vector form as an element pii ∈ R#(Xi×Yi).
We now generalize it to allow for uncertain payoffs. Player i is endowed with a
probability distribution Ppii ∈ ∆(R#(Xi×Yi)) over the possible payoff functions. In
particular, the random variable pii is independent of Y i, and so there is nothing new
to learn about payoffs from observing consequences. With random payoff functions,
the results extend provided that optimality is defined as follows: A strategy σi for
player i is optimal given µi ∈ ∆(Θi) if σi(xi | si) > 0 implies that
xi ∈ arg max
x¯i∈Xi
EPpiiEQ¯iµi (·|si,x¯i)
[
pii(x¯i, Y i)
]
.
Note that by interchanging the order of integration, this notion of optimality is equiv-
alent to the notion in the paper where the deterministic payoff function is given by
EPpiipi
i(·, ·).
Partial payoff feedback. Suppose that player i knows her own consequence function
f i : X × Ω → Yi and that her payoff function is now given by pii : X × Ω → R. In
particular, player i may not observe her own payoff, but observing a consequence may
provide partial information about (x−i, ω) and, therefore, about payoffs. Unlike the
case in the text where payoffs are observed, a belief µi ∈ ∆(Θi) may not uniquely
determine expected payoffs. The reason is that the distribution over consequences
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implied by µi may be consistent with several distributions over X−i × Ω; i.e., the
distribution over X−i × Ω is only partially identified. Define the set Mµi ⊆ ∆(X−i ×
Ω)S
i×Xi to be the set of conditional distributions over X−i ×Ω given (si, xi) ∈ Si ×Xi
that are consistent with belief µi ∈ ∆(Θi), i.e., m ∈ Mµi if and only if Q¯iµi(yi |
si, xi) = m (f i(xi, X−i,W ) = yi | si, xi) for all (si, xi) ∈ Si × Xi and yi ∈ Yi. Then
optimality should be defined as follows: A strategy σi for player i is optimal given
µi ∈ ∆(Θi) if there exists mµi ∈Mµi such that σi(xi | si) > 0 implies that
xi ∈ arg max
x¯i∈Xi
Emµi (·|si,x¯i)
[
pii(x¯i, X−i,W )
]
.
Finally, the definition of identification would also need to be changed to require not
only that there is a unique distribution over consequences that matches the observed
data, but also that this unique distribution implies a unique expected utility function.
F Global stability: Example 2.1 (monopoly with
unknown demand).
Theorem 3 says that all Berk-Nash equilibria can be approached with probability 1
provided we allow for vanishing optimization mistakes. In this appendix, we illustrate
how to use the techniques of stochastic approximation theory to establish stability
of equilibria under the assumption that players make no optimization mistakes. We
present the explicit learning dynamics for the monopolist with unknown demand,
Example 2.1, and show that the unique equilibrium in this example is globally stable.
The intuition behind global stability is that switching from the equilibrium strategy
to a strategy that puts more weight on a price of 2 changes beliefs in a way that makes
the monopoly want to put less weight on a price of 2, and similarly for a deviation to
a price of 10.
We first construct a perturbed version of the game. Then we show that the learning
problem is characterized by a nonlinear stochastic system of difference equations and
employ stochastic approximation methods for studying the asymptotic behavior of
such system. Finally, we take the payoff perturbations to zero.
In order to simplify the exposition and thus better illustrate the mechanism driving
the dynamics, we modify the subjective model slightly. We assume the monopolist only
learns about the parameter b ∈ R; i.e., her beliefs about parameter a are degenerate at
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a point a = 40 6= a0 and thus are never updated. Therefore, beliefs µ are probability
distributions over R, i.e., µ ∈ ∆(R).
Perturbed Game. Let ξ be a real-valued random variable distributed according
to Pξ; we use F to denote the associated cdf and f the pdf. The perturbed payoffs are
given by yx− ξ1{x = 10}. Thus, given beliefs µ ∈ ∆(R), the probability of optimally
playing x = 10 is
σ(µ) = F (8a− 96Eµ[B]) .
Note that the only aspect of µ that matters for the decision of the monopolist is Eµ[B].
Thus, letting m = Eµ[B] and slightly abusing notation, we use σ(µ) = σ(m) as the
optimal strategy.
Bayesian Updating. We now derive the Bayesian updating procedure. We as-
sume that the the prior µ0 is given by a Gaussian distribution with mean and vari-
ance m0, τ
2
0 .
55 It is possible to show that, given a realization (y, x) and a prior
N(m, τ 2), the posterior is also Gaussian and the mean and variance evolve as fol-
lows: mt+1 = mt +
(
−(Yt+1−a)
Xt+1
−mt
)(
X2t+1
X2t+1+τ
−2
t
)
and τ 2t+1 =
1
(X2t+1+τ
−2
t )
.
Nonlinear Stochastic Difference Equations and Stochastic Approximation.
For simplicity, let rt+1 ≡ 1t+1
(
τ−2t +X
2
t+1
)
and note that the previous nonlinear system
of stochastic difference equations can be written as
mt+1 = mt +
1
t+ 1
X2t+1
rt+1
(−(Yt+1 − a)
Xt+1
−mt
)
rt+1 = rt +
1
t+ 1
(
X2t+1 − rt
)
.
Let βt = (mt, rt)
′, Zt = (Xt, Yt),
G(βt, zt+1) =
[
x2t+1
rt+1
(
−(yt+1−a)
xt+1
−mt
)
(
x2t+1 − rt
) ]
55This choice of prior is standard in Gaussian settings like ours. As shown below this choice
simplifies the exposition considerably.
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and
G(β) =
[
G1(β)
G2(β)
]
= EPσ [G(β, Zt+1)]
=
[
F (8a− 96m)100
r
(
−(a0−a−b010)
10
−m
)
+ (1− F (8a− 96m)) 4
r
(
−(a0−a−b02)
2
−m
)
(4 + F (8a− 96m)96− r)
]
where Pσ is the probability over Z induced by σ (and y = a
0 − b0x + ω). Therefore,
the dynamical system can be cast as
βt+1 = βt +
1
t+ 1
G(βt) +
1
t+ 1
Vt+1
with Vt+1 = G(βt, Zt+1)−G(βt). Stochastic approximation theory (e.g., Kushner and
Yin (2003)) implies, roughly speaking, that in order to study the asymptotic behavior
of (βt)t it is enough to study the behavior of the orbits of the following ODE
β˙(t) = G(β(t)).
Characterization of the Steady States. In order to find the steady states
of (βt)t, it is enough to find β
∗ such that G(β∗) = 0. Let H1(m) ≡ F (8a −
96m)10 (−(a0 − a) + (b0 −m) 10)+(1− F (8a− 96m)) 2 (−(a0 − a) + (b0 −m) 2). Ob-
serve that G1(β) = r−1H1(m) and that H1 is continuous and limm→−∞H1(m) = ∞
and limm→∞H1(m) = −∞. Thus, there exists at least one solution H1(m) = 0.
Therefore, there exists at least one β∗ such that G(β∗) = 0.
Let b¯ = b0 − a0−a10 = 4− 15 = 195 and b = b0 − a0−a2 = 4− 42−402 = 3, r¯ = 4 + F (8a−
96b)96 and r = 4 + F (8a − 96b¯)96, and B ≡ [b, b¯] × [r, r¯]. It follows that H1(m) < 0
∀m > b¯, and thus m∗ must be such that m∗ ≤ b¯. It is also easy to see that m∗ ≥ b.
Moreover, dH1(m)
dm
= 96f(8a−96m)(8(a0−a)−(b0−m)96)−4−96F (8a−96m). Thus,
for any m ≤ b¯ , dH1(m)
dm
< 0, because m ≤ b¯ implies 8(a0−a) ≤ (b0−m)80 < (b0−m)96.
Therefore, on the relevant domain m ∈ [b, b¯], H1 is decreasing, thus implying that
there exists only one m∗ such that H1(m∗) = 0. Therefore, there exists only one β∗
such that G(β∗) = 0 .
We are now interested in characterizing the limit of β∗ as the perturbation vanishes,
i.e. as F converges to 1{ξ ≥ 0}. To do this we introduce some notation. We consider
a sequence (Fn)n that converges to 1{ξ ≥ 0} and use β∗n to denote the steady state
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associated to Fn. Finally, we use H
n
1 to denote the H1 associated to Fn.
We proceed as follows. First note that since β∗n ∈ B ∀n, the limit exists (going to
a subsequence if needed). We show that m∗ ≡ limn→∞m∗n = 8a96 = 84096 = 103 . Suppose
not, in particular, suppose that limn→∞m∗n <
8a
96
= 10
3
(the argument for the reverse
inequality is analogous and thus omitted). In this case limn→∞ 8a − 96m∗n > 0, and
thus limn→∞ Fn(8a− 96m∗n) = 1. Therefore
lim
n→∞
Hn1 (β
∗
n) = 10 (−(a0 − a) + (b0 −m∗) 10) ≥ 10
(
−2 + 2
3
10
)
> 0.
But this implies that ∃N such that Hn1 (β∗n) > 0 ∀n ≥ N which is a contradiction.
Moreover, define σ∗n = Fn(8a− 96m∗n) and σ∗ = limn→∞ σn. Since Hn1 (m∗n) = 0 ∀n
and m∗ = 10
3
, it follows that
σ∗ =
−2 (−2 + (4− 10
3
)
2
)
10
(−2 + (4− 10
3
)
10
)− 2 (−2 + (4− 10
3
)
2
) = 1
36
.
Global convergence to the Steady State. In our example, it is in fact
possible to establish that behavior converges with probability 1 to the unique equi-
librium. By the results in Benaim (1999) Section 6.3, it is sufficient to establish the
global asymptotic stability of β∗n for any n, i.e., the basin of attraction of β
∗
n is all of
B.
In order to do this let L(β) = (β − β∗n)′ P (β − β∗n) for all β; where P ∈ R2×2 is
positive definite and diagonal and will be determined later. Note that L(β) = 0 iff
β = β∗n . Also
dL(β(t))
dt
= ∇L(β(t))′G(β(t))
= 2 (β(t)− β∗n)′ P (G(β(t)))
= 2
{
(m(t)−m∗n)P[11]G1(β(t)) + (r(t)− r∗n)P[22]G2(β(t))
}
.
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Since G(β∗n) = 0,
dL(β(t))
dt
=2 (β(t)− β∗n)′ P (G(β(t))−G (β∗n))
=2 (m(t)−m∗n)P[11] (G1(β(t))−G1 (β∗n))
+ 2 (r(t)− r∗n)P[22] (G2(β(t))−G2 (β∗n))
=2 (m(t)−m∗n)2 P[11]
ˆ 1
0
∂G1(m∗n + s(m(t)−m∗n), r∗n)
∂m
ds
+ 2 (r(t)− r∗n)2 P[22]
ˆ 1
0
∂G2(m∗n, r∗n + s(r(t)− r∗n))
∂r
ds
where the last equality holds by the mean value theorem. Note that dG2(m
∗
n,r
∗
n+s(r(t)−r∗n))
dr
=
−1 and ´ 1
0
dG1(m∗n+s(m(t)−m∗n),r∗n)
dm
ds =
´ 1
0
(r∗n)
−1 dH1(m∗n+s(m(t)−m∗n))
dm
ds. Since r(t) > 0 and
r∗n ≥ 0 the first term is positive and we already established that dH1(m)dm < 0 ∀m in the
relevant domain. Thus, by choosing P[11] > 0 and P[22] > 0 it follows that
dL(β(t))
dt
< 0.
Therefore, we show that L satisfies the following properties: is strictly positive
∀β 6= β∗n and L(β∗n) = 0, and dL(β(t))dt < 0. Thus, the function satisfies all the conditions
of a Lyapounov function and, therefore, β∗n is globally asymptotically stable ∀n (see
Hirsch et al. (2004) p. 194).
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